Breard v. Alexandria
95 L. Ed. 2d 1233, 341 U.S. 622, 1951 U.S. LEXIS 1729 (1951)
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Rule of Law:
A local ordinance prohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation does not violate the Due Process Clause, Commerce Clause, or First Amendment guarantees of free speech and press when applied to commercial magazine subscription sales.
Facts:
- Jack H. Breard was a regional representative for Keystone Readers Service, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation.
- Breard managed a crew of solicitors who traveled from city to city, including Alexandria, Louisiana, selling subscriptions for nationally known magazines.
- Solicitors would go door-to-door to obtain subscriptions, spending a few days in each city depending on its size.
- Keystone Readers Service, Inc. would send acknowledgement cards to new subscribers from its home office, and publishers would then mail periodicals to subscribers via interstate commerce.
- The City of Alexandria had an ordinance declaring the practice of uninvited door-to-door solicitation of goods, wares, and merchandise a nuisance and a misdemeanor.
- The ordinance was enacted because some householders complained about undesirable or discourteous solicitors and unwanted intrusions into their privacy.
Procedural Posture:
- Jack H. Breard was arrested in Alexandria, Louisiana, for violating the ordinance by soliciting magazine subscriptions door-to-door without prior consent.
- Breard moved to quash the charges in the trial court, arguing the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause, Commerce Clause, and First Amendment.
- The trial court overruled Breard's motion, found him guilty, and sentenced him to a $25 fine or 30 days in jail.
- Breard, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which affirmed the conviction and expressly rejected the federal constitutional objections.
- Breard then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance prohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation, as applied to individuals soliciting magazine subscriptions, violate the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Reed
No, a municipal ordinance prohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation, even when applied to commercial magazine subscription sales, does not violate the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the city's police power to protect the privacy and tranquility of its residents. Regarding Due Process, the Court found that while soliciting is a legitimate occupation, it can be restricted in the public interest, as the ordinance only prohibits one method of solicitation (uninvited door-to-door), leaving other methods like radio, mail, and local agencies open. The usual methods of solicitation—radio, periodicals, mail, local agencies—are open. For the Commerce Clause, the Court determined the ordinance to be a permissible local regulation that does not unduly burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. Unlike cases where discrimination against out-of-state businesses was found (e.g., Dean Milk Co., Hood & Sons), this ordinance regulated the manner of doing business equally for all solicitors, local or interstate, and its economic effect on interstate commerce was deemed constitutionally immaterial. On the First Amendment claim, the Court acknowledged that selling periodicals does not strip them of protection, but emphasized that freedom of speech and press are not absolute. This case involved a commercial feature, distinguishing it from Martin v. Struthers, which concerned the free distribution of religious leaflets and was narrowly limited to non-commercial expression. The Court balanced the householders' desire for privacy against the publisher's preferred method of distribution and concluded that using First Amendment guarantees to force communities to admit solicitors to private homes would be a misuse of those rights.
Dissenting - Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
Yes, the ordinance constitutes an undue and discriminatory burden on interstate commerce, and therefore violates the Commerce Clause. Chief Justice Vinson argued that the ordinance is a "blanket prohibition" on solicitation, not a mere regulation, which has a severe economic impact on interstate commerce, particularly the magazine industry, which relies heavily on such solicitation (50-60% of annual subscriptions). He reiterated, citing Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District and Nippert v. Richmond, that soliciting orders for interstate goods is interstate commerce and cannot be subjected to burdens that discriminate against or unduly affect it. Vinson contended that the Court should evaluate the practical effect of the ordinance, which he believed discriminated against interstate commerce by favoring local retail merchants and explicitly exempting local farm product vendors. He disagreed with the majority's deferral to the city council, asserting that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of competing state/local and national interests under the Commerce Clause, citing Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. He found the ordinance inconsistent with Dean Milk Co. v. Madison because it protected local interests at the expense of interstate commerce without demonstrating reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
Yes, the ordinance violates the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and press because it restricts a legitimate method of circulating periodicals without prior homeowner invitation. Justice Black argued that the majority's decision fundamentally departs from the "preferred position philosophy" of the First Amendment, which protects the free communication of ideas. He contended that freedom of the press necessarily includes the liberty to publish, circulate, and solicit paying subscribers. While homeowners can personally forbid visitors, the First Amendment should prohibit laws that punish agents of the press who peacefully go door-to-door when the homeowner has not acted. He believed the decision was irreconcilable with Jones v. Opelika, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, and Martin v. Struthers, which protected door-to-door religious and political canvassing from municipal restrictions. He noted that while such an ordinance might constitutionally apply to a "merchant who goes from door to door 'selling pots,'" it should not apply to the press.
Analysis:
This case is significant for several reasons. First, it reasserted the primacy of local police powers to protect residential privacy and tranquility against commercial solicitation, even when interstate commerce is involved. Second, it distinguished commercial speech from purely religious or political speech in the context of First Amendment protection for door-to-door canvassing, a distinction that would evolve in later commercial speech jurisprudence. Third, the majority's upholding of the ordinance against a Commerce Clause challenge highlighted the Court's willingness to allow local regulations that affect, but do not directly discriminate against, interstate commerce, provided the regulation serves a legitimate local interest and is not a 'blanket prohibition' in practice, as the dissent argued.
