Braunfeld v. Brown
366 U.S. 599 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
A neutral state law of general applicability with a secular purpose does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if it imposes a significant indirect economic burden on individuals whose religious practices conflict with the law.
Facts:
- Abraham Braunfeld and other appellants were merchants of the Orthodox Jewish faith in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
- Their religious tenets required them to close their businesses from nightfall on Friday until nightfall on Saturday.
- To compensate for the Saturday closure, the appellants historically conducted a substantial amount of business on Sundays.
- In 1959, Pennsylvania enacted a 'Sunday Closing Law' that prohibited the retail sale of certain goods on Sunday.
- The law forced the appellants to remain closed for business on both Saturday (due to religious conviction) and Sunday (due to state law).
- The appellants alleged that this two-day closure would impair their ability to earn a livelihood and would force Braunfeld out of business, resulting in the loss of his capital investment.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants, Orthodox Jewish merchants, instituted a suit in a three-judge federal district court.
- The suit sought a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Pennsylvania's 1959 Sunday Closing Law.
- The three-judge court dismissed the complaint.
- The appellants then brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state's Sunday closing law, which has a secular purpose of providing a uniform day of rest, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when applied to Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religion requires them to close on Saturdays, thereby causing them significant economic disadvantage?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Warren
No. The Pennsylvania Sunday Closing Law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A statute with a valid secular purpose that indirectly burdens a religious practice is constitutional unless the state can achieve its purpose through alternative means that do not impose such a burden. The freedom to hold religious beliefs is absolute, but the freedom to act upon those beliefs is not. The law in question does not make any religious practice unlawful; it merely regulates a secular activity in a way that makes the observance of the appellants' religion more expensive. While this creates an economic hardship, striking down such legislation would radically restrict the legislature's ability to enact laws for the public welfare. The state's secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest and tranquility is a legitimate exercise of its power, and creating a religious exemption could undermine this goal and create significant enforcement problems.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan
Yes. While the law does not violate the Establishment or Equal Protection Clauses, it does prohibit the free exercise of the appellants' religion. The statute effectively forces an individual to choose between his business and his religion. The state's interest, which amounts to mere administrative convenience in having everyone rest on the same day, is not a compelling interest sufficient to justify this substantial burden on religious freedom. The availability of less restrictive alternatives, such as an exemption for those who observe a different Sabbath, demonstrates that the state's infringement on religious liberty is not necessary to achieve its secular goals. The Court has exalted administrative convenience to a constitutional level, which is an insufficient justification for making a religion economically disadvantageous.
Dissenting - Justice Stewart
Yes. The Pennsylvania law grossly violates the appellants' constitutional right to the free exercise of their religion. The statute compels an Orthodox Jew to make a cruel choice between his religious faith and his economic survival. This is a choice that no state can constitutionally demand, and the impact of the law cannot be ignored in the interest of 'enforced Sunday togetherness.'
Analysis:
This decision established that a neutral law of general applicability could withstand a Free Exercise challenge despite imposing a substantial, indirect economic burden on a religious practice. It drew a key distinction between laws that directly prohibit a religious act and those that merely make its observance more costly. This principle significantly shaped Free Exercise jurisprudence for decades, although its application was narrowed by the strict scrutiny test introduced in Sherbert v. Verner (1963). However, the core logic of Braunfeld, prioritizing neutral, generally applicable laws over claims of indirect religious burden, was largely resurrected by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith (1990).
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