Brauer v. N.Y. Central & H.R.R. Co.
91 N.J.L. 190, 103 A. 166 (1918) (1918)
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Rule of Law:
A wrongdoer whose negligence renders a person unable to protect their property is liable for the subsequent loss of that property by a third party's criminal act, as the theft is a foreseeable, concurrent result of the original negligence and not an independent intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation.
Facts:
- Plaintiff's wagon, operated by a single driver, was carrying empty barrels, a keg of cider, and a blanket.
- The wagon was struck by a train operated by Defendant Railroad in a grade-crossing collision.
- The collision killed the horse and destroyed the wagon.
- As a direct result of the collision, the plaintiff's driver was stunned and incapacitated, leaving him in a fit and unable to protect the wagon's contents.
- While the driver was incapacitated, unknown people at the scene stole the barrels, cider, and blanket from the wagon.
- The defendant's train had two railroad detectives on board to protect its own cargo from thieves, but they did not act to protect the plaintiff's property.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued the Defendant Railroad in a trial court to recover damages from a collision.
- The trial court permitted the plaintiff to recover not only for the horse and wagon but also for the value of the items stolen after the accident.
- The Defendant Railroad, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to this court, arguing that its negligence was not the proximate cause of the loss of the stolen items.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's negligence, which incapacitates a person's ability to protect their property, constitute the proximate cause of the loss of that property when it is subsequently stolen by an intervening third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Swayze, J.
Yes. A defendant's negligence that incapacitates a property owner's agent is the proximate cause of the loss of that property to theft. The court reasoned that the question of proximate cause and intervening cause is ordinarily for the jury. Here, the defendant's negligence directly resulted in the driver being unable to protect his employer's property. The theft of unguarded property in a large city was a natural and probable result of this incapacitation. The court held that the defendant should have foreseen this, especially since it employed its own detectives to guard against theft. Therefore, the act of the thieves was not a superseding cause but a concurrent event that was, for all practical purposes, simultaneous with the defendant's negligence.
Dissenting - Garrison, J.
No. The defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the loss from theft. The dissent argued that the unbroken continuity required for proximate cause is severed by the active intervention of an independent criminal actor. The collision merely provided an opportunity for the crime to occur; it did not cause it. To confound opportunity with causation defeats the established legal rule that a criminal act breaks the chain of causation. The law does not presume criminal intervention; in fact, it presumes the opposite.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the scope of proximate cause by holding that a foreseeable criminal act does not automatically break the chain of causation. It moves away from a rigid rule where any intervening crime is a superseding cause, instead favoring a more flexible analysis based on foreseeability. The ruling establishes that a tortfeasor has a duty to anticipate the probable consequences of their negligence, including criminal acts by third parties, if their negligence creates a situation of vulnerability. This precedent will influence future tort cases by allowing plaintiffs to recover for losses from third-party crimes when the defendant's negligence created the opportunity for the crime.
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