Brandreth v. Lance
1839 N.Y. LEXIS 391, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 1839 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 67 (1839)
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Rule of Law:
A court of equity does not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction to restrain the threatened publication of a libel against an individual. Such a pre-publication injunction, or prior restraint, infringes upon the freedom of the press.
Facts:
- Benjamin Brandreth was the manufacturer and seller of a proprietary medicine known as 'universal pills.'
- Sylvester Lance and other defendants were preparing to publish and sell a pamphlet described as a 'literary work' and a 'tale of fiction.'
- Brandreth alleged that this pamphlet was intended to be a gross libel upon him personally.
- The work purported to describe Brandreth as an extraordinary and fictitious character.
- Brandreth's complaint did not claim that the publication would violate any rights of literary property or cause injury to the sale of his pills.
Procedural Posture:
- Benjamin Brandreth, the complainant, filed a bill in the Court of Chancery of New York.
- The bill sought an injunction to restrain the defendants, Sylvester Lance and others, from publishing a pamphlet.
- The defendants filed a demurrer to the bill, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.
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Issue:
Does a court of equity have the jurisdiction to issue an injunction to prevent the publication of a work on the grounds that it constitutes a libel against an individual?
Opinions:
Majority - The Chancellor
No, a court of equity does not have jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel. To do so would be to exercise a power of preventive justice, or prior restraint, that is inconsistent with the principles of a free government and the liberty of the press. Historically, the power to enjoin libels was exercised by the discredited English Court of Star Chamber and has since been rejected. The only recognized basis upon which a court of equity may restrain a publication is to protect a right of property, such as literary property in private letters or copyrighted material. In this case, the complainant's bill seeks to protect his personal reputation from defamation, not a property interest. As the publication does not invade a right of literary or medical property, the court lacks jurisdiction to interfere. The complainant's proper remedy is to seek damages in a civil suit at law or to pursue a criminal prosecution after the libel has been published.
Analysis:
This case establishes a foundational principle in American jurisprudence against the use of prior restraints to enjoin libelous publications. It draws a sharp line between the protection of property rights, which equity courts can enforce through injunctions, and the protection of personal reputation, which must be remedied through post-publication lawsuits. The decision powerfully affirms the freedom of the press by rejecting judicial censorship, forcing individuals who claim they have been defamed to seek redress after the speech has occurred. This principle remains a cornerstone of First Amendment law, making it exceedingly difficult to obtain court orders to stop publications before they are released to the public.
