Brandon v. Chicago Board of Education
143 F.3d 293 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A party seeking relief from a judgment due to a court clerk's error or their own attorney's neglect must do so under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Such a motion is barred if not filed within one year of the judgment, and the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used to circumvent this time limit.
Facts:
- Lorenzo Brandon filed an Americans with Disabilities action against the Chicago Board of Education.
- The Clerk of the United States District Court erroneously entered the name and address of the wrong attorney, Paul A. Peters, as counsel for Brandon.
- As a result of this error, all court mailings, including notices for two status hearings, were sent to the incorrect attorney at the wrong address.
- The attorney who incorrectly received the mailings wrote to the Clerk's office to inform them of the error, but the Clerk's office did not correct it.
- Brandon's actual counsel, Paul F. Peters, never received notice of the status hearings and consequently failed to appear.
- Brandon's counsel did not check the court's file or otherwise monitor the case's progress for over a year after filing the complaint.
Procedural Posture:
- Lorenzo Brandon sued the Chicago Board of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- After Brandon's counsel failed to appear for two status hearings, the district court dismissed the case for want of prosecution on December 13, 1995.
- On December 16, 1996, Brandon's counsel filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 to vacate the judgment of dismissal.
- The district court denied Brandon's Rule 60 motion.
- Brandon (appellant) appealed the denial of his Rule 60 motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with the Chicago Board of Education as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a combination of a court clerk's error in sending notices to the wrong attorney and the attorney's own failure to monitor the case docket constitute grounds for relief under the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) when a motion to vacate is filed more than one year after judgment was entered?
Opinions:
Majority - Rovner, J.
No. A judgment resulting from a court clerk's error and an attorney's subsequent neglect falls under Rule 60(b)(1) and is subject to that rule's strict one-year time limit. The catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6) is mutually exclusive from Rule 60(b)(1) and cannot be used to grant relief when the grounds for the motion are classifiable as 'mistake' or 'neglect.' The court reasoned that Rule 60(b)(1), which covers 'mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,' explicitly applies to errors by both parties and judicial officers. Citing its precedent in Wesco Products Co. v. Alloy Automotive Co., the court emphasized that if the grounds for relief are covered by the specific clauses of Rule 60(b)(1)-(3), the catchall provision of 60(b)(6) is unavailable. Because Brandon's situation resulted from a clerk's 'mistake' and his attorney's 'neglect,' Rule 60(b)(1) was the proper vehicle for relief. The one-year time limit for that rule is jurisdictional and cannot be extended. As Brandon's motion was filed one year and three days after judgment, it was untimely, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strict, mutually exclusive nature of the subsections of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), preventing litigants from using the catchall provision of 60(b)(6) to evade the one-year statute of limitations for motions based on mistake or neglect. It places a significant burden on attorneys to diligently monitor their cases on the court docket, establishing that they cannot rely solely on the court's notice system, even when the court itself is the source of the error. The ruling severely curtails the availability of Rule 60(b)(6) for situations that, while seemingly extraordinary, can be categorized under the more specific provisions of Rule 60(b)(1).
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