Brandolino v. Lindsay
269 Cal.App.2d 319, 75 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1969)
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff who sues for specific performance of a real estate contract and, in the alternative, for damages is not precluded from recovering damages for a bad-faith breach if specific performance is denied. Filing a notice of lis pendens does not constitute an irrevocable election of the specific performance remedy.
Facts:
- Newton E. Lindsay owned an undivided one-half interest in a forty-acre parcel of land.
- On May 18, 1964, Lindsay signed escrow instructions to sell the entire forty acres to Dr. Brandolino and Mr. High for $50,000.
- Before signing the instructions, Lindsay had them reviewed and approved in writing by his attorney.
- On May 21, 1964, Lindsay instructed the escrow holder to cancel the transaction.
- When asked for his reason, Lindsay stated that he could 'get twice as much' for the property.
- Brandolino and High refused to cancel the escrow and repeatedly requested that Lindsay complete the sale, but he refused.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs Brandolino and High filed an action against defendant Lindsay in the trial court.
- The first amended complaint sought specific performance of the sales agreement or, in the alternative, $25,000 in damages for breach of contract.
- Plaintiffs also recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens against the subject property.
- During the trial, after evidence established the property's value was significantly higher than the contract price, the trial judge indicated that specific performance would be denied.
- In response, plaintiffs' counsel stated that they would abandon the cause of action for specific performance and proceed on the claim for damages.
- The trial court denied specific performance but found Lindsay acted in bad faith and entered a judgment awarding plaintiffs $25,000 in damages.
- Defendant Lindsay, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who sues for specific performance of a real estate contract, which is denied due to inadequate consideration, and who files a notice of lis pendens, thereby elect the remedy of specific performance and become precluded from recovering damages for the defendant's bad-faith breach of the contract?
Opinions:
Majority - Wood, P. J.
No. A plaintiff who is denied specific performance is not precluded from recovering damages for a bad-faith breach, and filing a lis pendens does not constitute an irrevocable election of remedies. A complaint may properly allege inconsistent theories in the alternative, such as a request for specific performance or, if that is unavailable, damages for breach of contract. When specific performance is denied because the consideration is not fair and reasonable, a court of equity may still award damages if the defendant's breach was committed in bad faith. 'Bad faith' under the relevant statute does not require fraud, but merely a 'deliberate refusal to perform without just cause or excuse,' which was supported by Lindsay's admission that he breached to get a higher price. Furthermore, a lis pendens is merely a procedural tool to provide constructive notice to potential purchasers that the property is subject to litigation; it does not operate as a substantive election of one remedy over another.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the procedural flexibility afforded to plaintiffs in contract disputes, confirming that pleading alternative and even inconsistent remedies is permissible. It clarifies that a court's refusal to grant an equitable remedy like specific performance does not extinguish a plaintiff's right to a legal remedy like damages. The case is significant for its interpretation of 'bad faith' in the context of real estate contracts, establishing that a seller's refusal to perform simply to pursue a more lucrative offer constitutes a bad-faith breach, triggering enhanced damages. Finally, it demystifies the role of a lis pendens, confirming it is a notice mechanism, not a binding election of remedies that would bar a plaintiff from recovering damages.
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