Brady v. National Football League
190 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3441, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14111, 644 F. 3d 661 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin a lockout in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. A dispute between professional athletes and their league over terms of employment remains a 'labor dispute' under the Act even if the players' union has disclaimed its status as the collective bargaining representative.
Facts:
- The National Football League (NFL) and the NFL Players Association (NFLPA), the players' union, operated under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
- In May 2008, the NFL exercised its option to terminate the CBA, setting it to expire in March 2011.
- The NFL and the NFLPA engaged in over two years of unsuccessful negotiations for a new CBA.
- The NFL announced its intention to implement a lockout of the players if a new agreement was not reached before the expiration of the old one.
- On March 11, 2011, hours before the CBA expired, the NFLPA officially disclaimed its status as the players' collective bargaining representative following a vote by the players.
- On March 12, 2011, after the CBA expired, the NFL instituted a lockout, which prohibited players from entering team facilities, receiving compensation, or performing employment duties.
- A group of players, including Tom Brady, then filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL, asserting the lockout constituted an illegal group boycott and price-fixing agreement.
Procedural Posture:
- Nine professional football players and one prospective player ('the Players') sued the NFL and its 32 teams in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
- The Players alleged the NFL's lockout violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop it.
- The district court granted the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was inapplicable because the NFLPA had disclaimed its union status.
- The NFL (appellant) appealed the district court's order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Eighth Circuit granted the NFL's motion to stay the district court's injunction pending the outcome of the appeal.
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Issue:
Does the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprive a federal district court of jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction against a lockout implemented by a professional sports league against its players, even after the players' union has disclaimed its status as their collective bargaining representative?
Opinions:
Majority - Colloton, J.
Yes. The Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) strips federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the NFL's lockout because the underlying conflict is a 'labor dispute' under the Act's plain text. The court's jurisdiction to issue an injunction is strictly limited by the NLGA in any case 'involving or growing out of a labor dispute.' This case falls squarely within the Act's broad definition of a 'labor dispute' because it is a 'controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment' between 'one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees.' The disclaimer of the union's status does not instantaneously transform the nature of the dispute, as the conflict's origins and subject matter remain rooted in the labor relationship. Furthermore, § 4(a) of the NLGA, which prohibits injunctions against any person from 'ceasing or refusing... to remain in any relation of employment,' applies to employer-initiated lockouts, not merely employee-initiated strikes. While an injunction regarding non-employees like free agents and rookies might be possible, it would have to comply with the strict procedural requirements of NLGA § 7, which the district court failed to follow. Therefore, the entire injunction must be vacated.
Dissenting - Bye, J.
No. The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not deprive the court of jurisdiction because once the players' union decertified, the conflict ceased to be a 'labor dispute' and became a purely antitrust matter. The historical purpose of the NLGA was to protect organized labor from judicial interference on behalf of employers, not to shield employers from antitrust liability when dealing with non-unionized employees. The term 'labor dispute' should be interpreted in light of this pro-union purpose and requires the presence of organized labor activity. As the Supreme Court suggested in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws ends with the 'collapse of the collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the union.' This same logic should apply here. Even if this were a labor dispute, § 4(a) of the NLGA was intended to protect the employees' right to strike, not the employers' right to lock out, a conclusion supported by the legislative history of both the NLGA and the Clayton Act and the holdings of several other circuit courts. The majority's decision improperly turns a shield designed for labor into a sword for management against individual employees.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the broad and enduring nature of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of a 'labor dispute,' establishing that a union's decertification does not immediately strip a conflict of this status. It significantly strengthens the position of employers, particularly in professional sports, by confirming that a lockout is a protected economic weapon shielded from federal court injunctions, even when employees attempt to reframe the dispute under antitrust law. The ruling forces employee groups to recognize that dissolving their union is not a simple path to obtaining injunctive relief against employer actions that stem from a collective bargaining impasse. This precedent ensures that courts will look to the underlying substance of a conflict, rather than the formal status of the union, when determining the applicability of the NLGA.
