Bradley v. State
1 Miss. 156 (1824)
Rule of Law:
Under early common law, a husband could inflict moderate physical chastisement upon his wife without criminal liability for assault and battery, provided it remained within reasonable bounds for the purpose of restraint for misbehavior, a principle upheld by courts for public policy reasons despite its perceived abhorrence.
Facts:
- A defendant was accused of committing an assault and battery.
- The person upon whom the assault and battery was allegedly committed was Lydia Bradly.
- The defendant claimed that Lydia Bradly was his lawful wife at the time the alleged incident occurred.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury indicted the defendant for common assault and battery in the circuit court (the trial court/court of first instance).
- The defendant pleaded not guilty, self-defense ('son assault demesne'), and that Lydia Bradly was his lawful wife.
- During the trial, the defendant's counsel requested the circuit court to instruct the jury that if Lydia Bradly was the defendant's wife, they could not find him guilty.
- The circuit court refused this instruction and instead charged the jury that a husband could commit an assault and battery on his wife.
- The defendant filed a bill of exceptions to the circuit court's ruling.
- The defendant brought the case before the highest court of the state by writ of error upon petition.
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Issue:
Can a husband be convicted of assault and battery for physically chastising his wife, given the historical common law allowance for moderate correction?
Opinions:
Majority - Hot. Powhattan Ellis
Yes, a husband can commit an assault and battery upon the body of his wife if his actions exceed the historically permitted bounds of moderate correction, a principle that, while subject to limitations, still acknowledges a husband's right to physically chastise his wife for misbehavior under early common law. The court affirmed the trial court's position, recognizing the 'old law' that a husband 'might give his wife moderate correction' due to his responsibility for her misbehavior. Though this power was doubted over time and limited by specific judicial interpretation (e.g., a 'whip or rattan, no bigger than my thumb'), the court found that public policy and expediency in domestic relations necessitated maintaining the husband's right to 'moderate chastisement, in cases of great emergency, and use salutary restraints in every case of misbehaviour' to prevent family disputes from becoming 'deplorable spectacle[s]' in public courts and to screen parties from 'vexatious prosecutions' and mutual discredit. The court indicated that if the defendant had shown he 'confined himself within reasonable bounds,' they would have deliberated long before affirming the judgment, implying the jury's guilty verdict meant his actions exceeded such bounds.
Analysis:
This case starkly illustrates the legal subjugation of married women in the early 19th century, where the law granted husbands a qualified right to inflict physical violence upon their wives under the guise of 'moderate correction.' The court's reasoning, rooted in ancient common law and concerns for public policy (specifically, avoiding public scrutiny of domestic 'broils'), legally sanctioned a form of marital violence. This ruling contributed to a legal environment that minimized state intervention in private family matters, even when physical abuse was present, and perpetuated gender inequality by denying married women full bodily autonomy and protection from assault within their marriages. The 'thumb rule' became a notorious symbol of this historical legal allowance for domestic violence.
