Lexplug logoLexplug

Bradley et al. v. School Board of the City of Richmond et al.

Supreme Court of United States
416 U.S. 696 (1974)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

An appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.


Facts:

  • In 1961, 11 Negro parents sued the School Board of Richmond, Virginia, to desegregate the city's public schools.
  • The school district operated under a 'freedom of choice' plan for several years, which proved ineffective at creating a unitary, non-racial school system.
  • Following the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County School Board, which found such plans insufficient, the plaintiffs filed a motion for further relief on March 10, 1970.
  • In their 1970 motion, the plaintiffs requested that the School Board be ordered to implement a plan to create a unitary system and also asked the court to award them reasonable attorney's fees.
  • The School Board acknowledged that its schools were not unitary under recent Supreme Court precedents but failed to take voluntary action, submitting several desegregation plans that the court initially found unacceptable.
  • After rejecting the Board's initial plans, the court ordered an interim plan for the 1970-1971 school year.
  • On April 5, 1971, the court finally adopted a comprehensive desegregation plan submitted by the Board, which involved pupil reassignments and extensive transportation.

Procedural Posture:

  • Negro parents and guardians filed a class action lawsuit against the School Board of Richmond, Virginia, in U.S. District Court in 1961.
  • On March 10, 1970, the plaintiffs filed a motion for further relief which included a request for attorney's fees.
  • On May 26, 1971, the District Court awarded the plaintiffs $43,355 in attorney's fees and over $13,000 in expenses for services rendered from March 10, 1970, to January 29, 1971.
  • The School Board (appellant) appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
  • While the appeal was pending, Congress passed the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, which included § 718, authorizing fee awards in school desegregation cases.
  • The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's award, holding that § 718 did not apply to services rendered before its enactment and the award was not otherwise justified.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the attorney's fees.

Locked

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does a newly enacted statute authorizing attorney's fees in school desegregation cases apply to legal services that were rendered before the statute's effective date in a case that was pending on appeal when the statute was enacted?


Opinions:

Majority - Mr. Justice Blackmun

Yes. An appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision unless manifest injustice would result. Section 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act, enacted while this case was on appeal, provides a statutory basis for awarding attorney's fees. The court's reasoning is anchored in the principle from United States v. Schooner Peggy, which dictates that an intervening law must be obeyed by an appellate court. This rule applies unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary or its application would cause 'manifest injustice.' To determine if there is manifest injustice, the court considers: (a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the nature of their rights, and (c) the impact of the legal change on those rights. Here, the litigation involves a public school board and students vindicating constitutional rights, not a 'mere private case.' The plaintiffs acted as 'private attorneys general' to enforce a 'great national concern.' Furthermore, the School Board had no matured or unconditional right to its publicly-allocated funds that would be infringed, and the new law did not impose an unforeseen substantive obligation, as the Board was already potentially liable for fees under common law theories and its primary constitutional duty to desegregate remained unchanged.



Analysis:

This decision solidifies the principle that newly enacted statutes, particularly remedial civil rights legislation, apply to cases pending on direct review. It establishes a three-part framework for the 'manifest injustice' exception, making it a high bar to overcome, especially for governmental entities in public interest litigation. By endorsing the 'private attorney general' theory for school desegregation cases, the Court reinforced a key mechanism for enforcing civil rights, encouraging plaintiffs to bring such suits by creating a more certain path to recovering litigation costs.

G

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Bradley et al. v. School Board of the City of Richmond et al. (1974)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"