Boyles v. Kerr
855 S.W.2d 593 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Texas law does not recognize a general duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress. A claimant may recover mental anguish damages only when they result from the defendant's breach of some other legally recognized duty.
Facts:
- Dan Boyles, Jr., then 17, and Susan Leigh Kerr, then 19, were in a sexual relationship during the summer of 1985.
- On August 10, 1985, Boyles arranged with his friend, Karl Broesche, to have sexual intercourse with Kerr at Broesche's home.
- At Broesche's suggestion, he, Boyles, and two other friends, Ray Widner and John Paul Tamborello, agreed to videotape the encounter.
- The friends hid a video camera in a bedroom and recorded themselves making crude jokes before leaving the camera running.
- Boyles brought Kerr to the house, and their subsequent sexual intercourse was videotaped without Kerr's knowledge or consent.
- Boyles later took possession of the tape and showed it to approximately ten friends on three separate occasions.
- Gossip about the videotape spread widely among their social circles at their respective universities.
- Kerr learned of the video in December 1985 and suffered severe humiliation and emotional distress, for which she eventually sought psychological counselling.
Procedural Posture:
- Susan Leigh Kerr sued Dan Boyles, Jr. and three other men in a Texas trial court.
- Kerr's petition alleged intentional invasion of privacy, negligent invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Prior to submission to the jury, Kerr dropped all claims except for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Kerr, awarding her $500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.
- The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
- Only Boyles, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Boyles, as Petitioner, sought and was granted review by the Supreme Court of Texas, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Does Texas law recognize an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Phillips
No. There is no general duty in Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress. The court overrules the language in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard to the extent it recognized such an independent tort, finding that Garrard was based on a misinterpretation of prior case law. The court reasoned that foreseeability of emotional harm alone is not a meaningful limit on liability and could lead to limitless claims for intangible injuries. While abolishing the independent tort, the court affirmed that mental anguish damages remain recoverable when connected to the breach of another recognized legal duty, such as invasion of privacy, wrongful death, or defamation. The court also held that a physical manifestation of emotional distress is not required for a claimant to recover such damages where a breach of another duty is established.
Dissenting - Justice Doggett
Yes. The court should recognize a duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress, particularly in a case involving such egregious facts. The dissent argues that the majority is wrongly overruling precedent and abdicating its responsibility to protect individuals from severe emotional harm. It criticizes the majority for failing to apply the standard factors for determining legal duty, which would consider the risk, foreseeability, and social utility of the actor's conduct. The dissent contends the majority's fear of 'limitless liability' is unfounded and that by eliminating the cause of action, the court is extending greater protection to the mishandling of corpses than to the outrageous and exploitative treatment of a living person, particularly a woman.
Concurring - Justice Gonzalez
No. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's holding but emphasizes the pivotal role of insurance in the case. The author points out that Kerr's attorneys strategically dropped viable intentional tort claims, such as invasion of privacy, to proceed solely on a negligence theory. This was likely done to trigger coverage under the defendants' homeowners' insurance policies, which typically cover negligent acts but exclude intentional ones. The concurrence argues that the court should not expand a questionable negligence tort to allow plaintiffs to seek recovery from a 'deep pocket' insurer for what was clearly intentional and outrageous conduct.
Concurring - Justice Cook
No. This opinion concurs with the majority's holding that there is no independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress but writes separately to clarify a point of confusion. The opinion distinguishes between a cause of action and an element of damages. While the cause of action is rejected, the opinion stresses that damages for mental anguish are still recoverable for many other torts, and that the part of St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard that correctly eliminated the physical manifestation requirement for such damages remains good law.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant retrenchment in Texas tort law, abolishing the independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress that the same court had recognized only five years earlier in St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard. By requiring claims for emotional distress to be 'tethered' to another recognized tort, the court significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs seeking damages for purely emotional harm. This holding forces litigants to plead and prove a more specific underlying wrong, such as invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress, which often involves a higher standard of culpability than mere negligence. The case serves as a key example of judicial concern over foreseeability as a basis for duty and the potential for 'limitless liability' for intangible injuries.
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