Bowyer v. Ducey

Majority - Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

No, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to set aside certified state election results when the plaintiffs lack Article III standing, their claims are barred by laches and mootness, and their allegations of widespread fraud fail to meet heightened federal pleading standards. The Court dismissed the complaint for several independent reasons, beginning with a lack of Article III standing. The plaintiffs, including GOP Chairs and presidential elector nominees, failed to establish a concrete, particularized "injury in fact" distinct from a generalized grievance about government conduct, as required by cases like Spokeo II and Lance v. Coffman. Specifically, the elector nominees were deemed to have a ministerial role under Arizona law, not that of candidates suffering a discrete injury, and their vote dilution claims were found to be generalized grievances rather than specific allegations of votes being weighed differently. Secondly, the Court applied the Colorado River abstention doctrine, finding that factors such as the convenience of the federal forum, the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation given similar ongoing state court cases (like Ward v. Jackson), the primacy of state court jurisdiction, and the reliance on Arizona election law weighed heavily in favor of abstention. This deference to state courts prevented an affront to federal-state relations. Thirdly, the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiffs' demands for relief. The Court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate state immunity, and the Ex parte Young exception for prospective injunctive relief against ongoing federal law violations was inapplicable because the plaintiffs' claims were either disguised state law claims or sought to undo past conduct rather than enjoin an ongoing violation. Fourthly, the doctrine of laches barred the claims due to the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay in filing the action. Despite possessing information about alleged irregularities well before Election Day, the plaintiffs waited nearly a month after the election and two days after certification to file. This delay caused extreme prejudice to the defendants and the administration of justice, especially given the approaching Electoral College deadline. Fifthly, the case was deemed moot because the requested relief, such as enjoining the transmission of certified results or ordering decertification, was impossible. The results had already been transmitted, and the Court found no power under federal or Arizona law to "de-certify" an election. Any other relief would therefore be meaningless. Finally, the complaint failed to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) because the fraud allegations lacked particularity and plausibility. The Court found the plaintiffs' hundreds of pages of attachments to be based on anonymous witnesses, hearsay, and unreliable analysis, failing to specify "who, what, where, when, and how" the alleged fraud occurred. More plausible explanations existed for observed "spikes" in vote totals, preventing the claims from moving "from conceivable to plausible." The Court concluded that "allegations that find favor in the public sphere of gossip and innuendo cannot be a substitute for earnest pleadings and procedure in federal court."