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Bowsher v. Synar

Supreme Court of United States
478 U.S. 714 (1986)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws, except by impeachment. Granting executive functions to an officer who is removable by a joint resolution of Congress is therefore unconstitutional.


Facts:

  • In 1985, Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, to eliminate the federal budget deficit.
  • The Act set annual maximum deficit amounts, and if projected deficits exceeded these amounts, it mandated automatic, across-the-board spending cuts.
  • The Act required the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to submit deficit estimates and proposed budget reductions to the Comptroller General.
  • The Comptroller General was required to review these submissions, exercise independent judgment, and issue a final, binding report to the President specifying the precise spending reductions to be made.
  • The President was then legally required to issue a sequestration order implementing the cuts exactly as specified in the Comptroller General's report.
  • Under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Comptroller General is an officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate but is removable not only by impeachment but also by a joint resolution of Congress for specific causes like 'inefficiency' or 'neglect of duty'.

Procedural Posture:

  • Congressman Synar filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional.
  • The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) filed a similar lawsuit, and the cases were consolidated.
  • A three-judge District Court panel held that the reporting provisions of the Act were unconstitutional because they violated the separation of powers doctrine.
  • The United States and the Comptroller General, as appellants, took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Issue:

Does the assignment of executive functions to the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violate the separation of powers doctrine because the Comptroller General is removable by Congress for causes other than impeachment?


Opinions:

Majority - Chief Justice Burger

Yes. Placing the responsibility for executing the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer subject to removal by Congress violates the separation of powers. The Constitution does not permit Congress to play a direct role in the execution of the laws. The functions assigned to the Comptroller General under the Act, such as interpreting the law and commanding the President to make specific budget cuts, are executive in nature. Because Congress retains removal authority over the Comptroller General for causes far broader than impeachment, the Comptroller General is subservient to the legislative branch. To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws is, in essence, to reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws, which intrudes upon the executive function and is constitutionally impermissible, as established in precedents like INS v. Chadha.


Concurring - Justice Stevens

Yes. The Act is unconstitutional not primarily because of the congressional removal power, but because the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress. The Comptroller General's longstanding statutory responsibilities demonstrate a primary obligation to the legislative branch. The functions assigned under the Act—making binding policy that will affect the entire nation—are fundamentally legislative. When Congress or its agent seeks to make national policy, it must adhere to the procedures mandated by Article I of the Constitution: passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. Delegating this core policymaking power to an agent like the Comptroller General allows Congress to evade these constitutionally required procedures, which is impermissible under the principles of INS v. Chadha.


Dissenting - Justice White

No. The Court's decision rests on a 'distressingly formalistic' view of separation of powers and invalidates a major legislative response to a national crisis based on a triviality. The congressional removal power does not make the Comptroller General subservient to Congress. Removal is only for specified cause and requires a joint resolution, which must be passed by both Houses and signed by the President (or his veto overridden), making it a legislative act that satisfies the requirements of INS v. Chadha. This process, which includes the President, renders the Comptroller General one of the most independent officers in government, not a congressional tool. The Court's rigid approach ignores the practical reality and unduly constricts Congress's ability to create innovative solutions to pressing national problems.


Dissenting - Justice Blackmun

No. Even if the Comptroller General's executive functions are constitutionally incompatible with the congressional removal power, the Court has chosen the wrong remedy. Instead of striking down the central provisions of the landmark Deficit Control Act, the Court should have invalidated the 'cumbersome, 65-year-old removal power that has never been exercised.' The proper judicial remedy is the one that causes the least disruption to congressional objectives. It is far more sensible to cure the incompatibility by striking down the dormant 1921 removal provision than to nullify an extraordinarily important piece of legislation designed to address a fiscal crisis of unprecedented proportions.



Analysis:

This decision reinforces a formalist interpretation of the separation of powers, establishing a clear prohibition against Congress delegating executive authority to an officer it controls through removal power. It extends the logic of INS v. Chadha, which limited Congress's role after a law is passed, by preventing Congress from indirectly executing laws through a subservient agent. The ruling significantly impacts how Congress can structure independent agencies and delegate authority, forcing a clearer division between legislative and executive functions and ensuring that officers who execute laws remain accountable to the Executive Branch.

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