Bowie v. Murphy
2006 Va. LEXIS 19, 624 S.E.2d 74, 271 Va. 127 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Civil courts retain subject matter jurisdiction over defamation claims against church members and leaders if the claims can be resolved using neutral principles of law without entangling the court in issues of church governance or religious doctrine. Furthermore, the tort of assault requires an act intended to cause harmful or offensive contact or apprehension of such contact, creating a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery, and does not require physical injury.
Facts:
- David M. Bowie was a member of the Board of Deacons of Greater Little Zion Baptist Church, where James T. Murphy, Jr. became pastor in 1990.
- Under Murphy's leadership, the Church experienced significant "divisiveness and strife," leading congregants to petition the Board of Deacons for Murphy's removal in 2003.
- On June 21, 2003, at a scheduled vote on Murphy's retention, Audrey Thornton and her children attended to disrupt the process, placing pro-Murphy placards around the voting area.
- After Board members removed the placards, Thornton's daughter informed her, making Thornton "enraged," and she charged down stairs past Bowie, forcefully opened the voting area door, and began taking pictures and writing names.
- Bowie gently touched Thornton's shoulder to gain her attention; Thornton responded by cursing him and attempting to strike him with her camera.
- Bowie grasped Thornton's wrist to protect himself, and as she violently pushed back, he released her; Thornton then struck Bowie in the chest with her free hand.
- After the incident, Thornton "willfully, falsely, and with malice" told police and Church members, including Murphy, that Bowie had assaulted her, and solicited false statements from non-witnesses.
- Murphy subsequently called a Church meeting where he told the congregation Bowie had assaulted Thornton, and called for a motion to dismiss Bowie as a deacon and demote his church membership status; Vivian Pace made the motion, seconded by LaJuanna Russell, based on the alleged assault. Murphy also sent a letter to the congregation making the accusation, and David Pace and Vivian Pace sent emails to third parties accusing Bowie of assault.
Procedural Posture:
- On June 17, 2004, David M. Bowie filed a motion for judgment in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County against James T. Murphy, Jr., Vivian Pace, David Pace, LaJuanna Russell, and Audrey Thornton, including counts for assault, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The defendants filed a demurrer and special plea in bar, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction over defamation claims based on Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church and asserting Bowie's assault claim failed because he initiated contact and that truth was a defense to defamation.
- On October 21, 2004, the circuit court sustained the defendants' demurrer on the defamation counts without leave to amend, citing Cha and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also sustained the demurrer to Bowie's assault claim for failure to allege physical injury but granted Bowie leave to amend it within 21 days.
- On October 29, 2004, Bowie filed an amended motion for judgment for assault against Thornton, alleging fear of injury and an actual strike, but again did not allege physical injury. Bowie also included assault claims against Murphy and a battery claim, which the court later determined exceeded the scope of leave to amend.
- The remaining defendants filed a demurrer to the amended motion for judgment, again claiming Bowie failed to state an assault cause of action due to the lack of alleged physical injury.
- On January 7, 2005, the circuit court issued a final order sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the amended motion for judgment, without stating specific grounds.
- Bowie filed a notice of appeal on January 19, 2005, to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which granted the appeal limited to the issues of the defamation claims being barred by Cha and the sustaining of the demurrer to the amended assault claim.
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Issue:
1. Does the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bar civil courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over defamation claims made by church members against other church members and leaders when those claims can be resolved without addressing issues of church governance or religious doctrine? 2. Did the circuit court err in sustaining a demurrer to an assault claim where the plaintiff alleged an attempt to strike and an actual strike, placing the plaintiff in reasonable fear of physical injury, but did not allege physical injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.
Yes, the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer to Bowie's defamation claims because they can be resolved using neutral principles of law without involving issues of church governance or religious doctrine. The court distinguishes this case from Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, noting that in Cha, the defamation claims were inextricably linked to an ecclesiastical decision regarding a pastor's termination and fitness, requiring entanglement in church governance. Here, Bowie's defamation claims arise from allegations of assault, a secular tort, the veracity and impact of which on Bowie's reputation can be evaluated by civil courts using neutral legal principles, independent of the internal church dispute over Murphy's pastorate or Bowie's deacon status. The critical inquiry is whether the court can decide the case "without reference to issues of faith and doctrine." Yes, the circuit court also erred in sustaining the demurrer to Bowie's assault claim because he sufficiently pled a cause of action, and physical injury is not an element of the tort of assault. The tort of assault requires "an act intended to cause either harmful or offensive contact... or apprehension of such contact, and that creates in the other person's mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery." Physical touching or injury is not required. Bowie alleged Thornton attempted to strike him with a camera, placing him in fear of physical injury, and also that she actually struck him in the chest. Both allegations sufficiently plead the elements of assault, describing an intent to cause apprehension of harmful contact and a reasonable apprehension. The subsequent battery (actual contact) does not negate the assault claim arising from the anticipation of harm. The injury compensated in assault is the mental injury from apprehension. The court also noted that Bowie's assault claims against Murphy in the amended motion were outside the scope of leave to amend and thus not properly asserted.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Agee (with whom Justice Kinser joins)
No, the Cha decision does bar Bowie's defamation claims against Vivian Pace and LaJuanna Russell (specifically paragraphs 55-58 of Count II) because these allegations are directly tied to an ecclesiastical governance decision regarding Bowie's removal as a Deacon and change in church membership status. Justice Agee argues that Pace and Russell's alleged defamatory statements were not merely isolated accusations of assault, but were "recommendations" and a "motion" made at a church meeting specifically for the purpose of removing Bowie from his deacon position and altering his membership status based on the alleged assault. These actions are an "integral part of church governance and internal organization," and adjudicating them would require the court to involve itself in ecclesiastical decisions regarding the appointment and removal of church leaders, which Cha explicitly prohibits. Limiting a church's choice of its religious representatives constitutes an impermissible burden on First Amendment rights. Justice Agee concurs with the majority that Cha does not bar Bowie's other defamation claims and that Bowie's motion for judgment sufficiently stated a claim for assault against Audrey Thornton, and that his assault claims against Murphy were not properly before the Court.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine in Virginia, establishing a nuanced approach to civil court jurisdiction over tort claims arising within a church context. It narrows the Cha precedent by emphasizing that not all claims originating from church-related disputes are barred, only those requiring entanglement in religious governance or doctrine. The ruling also reinforces the well-defined elements of the tort of assault, explicitly stating that physical injury is not a requisite element, thus distinguishing it clearly from battery and affirming that mental apprehension of harm is sufficient for a claim. This distinction prevents summary dismissal of assault claims where no physical contact occurred or where injury is not alleged, providing clearer guidance for plaintiffs and courts in future cases.
