Bowen v. Roy
1986 U.S. LEXIS 52, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S. Ct. 2147 (1986)
Rule of Law:
The Free Exercise Clause does not compel the government to accommodate a religiously based objection to a facially neutral, uniformly applicable statutory requirement for providing a Social Security number as a condition for receiving welfare benefits, where the requirement is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest in preventing fraud and abuse. Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause does not provide an individual the right to dictate the government's internal administrative procedures, such as its use of an already assigned Social Security number.
Facts:
- Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller applied for and received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp programs.
- Roy and Miller refused to comply with federal statutory requirements to furnish their state welfare agencies with the Social Security number (SSN) of their 2-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, as a condition for receiving benefits.
- Appellees contended that obtaining an SSN for Little Bird of the Snow would violate their Native American religious beliefs, as Roy believed it would "rob her spirit" and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power due to its uniqueness and potential uses.
- The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare subsequently terminated AFDC and medical benefits for Little Bird of the Snow and initiated proceedings to reduce the food stamps for the household.
- Roy had recently developed this religious objection, having previously obtained SSNs for himself, Miller, and their older daughter, Renee.
- During the trial, a federal officer discovered that an SSN had already been assigned to Little Bird of the Snow at birth under the name "Little Bird of the Snow Roy."
- Roy then testified that his religious objection would be violated only by the "use" of the SSN, not its mere existence, as no known use had yet occurred.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellees Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Secretaries of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture.
- The District Court denied appellees' request for damages and benefits.
- The District Court granted injunctive relief, permanently restraining the Secretary of Health and Human Services from making any use of the SSN issued to Little Bird of the Snow and from disseminating the number.
- The District Court also enjoined federal and state defendants from denying Roy cash assistance, medical assistance, and food stamps for Little Bird of the Snow until her 16th birthday, due to the appellees' refusal to provide an SSN for her.
- The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction for the case.
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Issue:
Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment compel the government to accommodate a religiously based objection to statutory requirements that a Social Security number be provided by an applicant seeking welfare benefits and that states use these numbers in administering benefit programs?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
No, the Free Exercise Clause does not compel the government to accommodate such an objection. The Court distinguishes between the absolute freedom of individual belief and the non-absolute freedom of individual conduct. It holds that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Therefore, Roy cannot object to the government's use of an already assigned Social Security number for his daughter, as this does not in any degree impair his freedom to believe, express, or exercise his religion. This part of the District Court's injunction must be vacated. Regarding the requirement that applicants furnish an SSN as a condition of eligibility, the Court reiterates that not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. It states that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adhering to religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental action that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels objectionable conduct for religious reasons. For such neutral and uniformly applicable requirements for governmental benefits, the government meets its burden when it demonstrates that the requirement is a "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." The Court rejects the application of the "compelling state interest" and "least restrictive means" test from cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder in this context, distinguishing it from Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div. on the grounds that those cases involved statutes with mechanisms for individualized exemptions ("good cause"). Preventing fraud in massive welfare programs is a legitimate and important public interest, and the SSN requirement is a reasonable means to promote this goal through unique identification and computer matching techniques. The refusal to grant a special exemption in this context does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Dissenting - Justice White
Yes, based on prior precedent, the government should have to accommodate their beliefs. Justice White dissents, stating his view that Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div. and Sherbert v. Verner control this case, implying that the compelling interest test should have been applied and the government failed to meet it.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
The injunction against government use of the SSN was overbroad (agrees with majority Part II). Regarding the requirement to furnish the SSN, the compelling interest test should apply. Justice Blackmun joins Parts I and II of the Chief Justice's opinion, agreeing that the injunction preventing the government's internal use or dissemination of an already existing SSN is too broad because it stretches the Free Exercise Clause too far to require the government to refrain from acting in ways that appellees believe will harm their daughter’s spiritual development. However, he believes the question of whether appellees can be required to furnish the SSN as a condition for benefits should be decided under the compelling interest test of Sherbert, Thomas, and Wisconsin v. Yoder. He indicates that if the issue proves necessary on remand, he agrees with Justice O’Connor that the government has not met its burden to deny assistance solely due to the religious objection.
Concurring in part and concurring in the result - Justice Stevens
The injunction against government use of the SSN was erroneous. The claim regarding furnishing the SSN is moot or unripe. Justice Stevens joins Part II of the majority opinion, agreeing that the District Court erred in enjoining the government's routine use of the SSN that had already been assigned to Little Bird of the Snow, as the Free Exercise Clause does not give an individual the right to dictate the government’s method of recordkeeping. Having resolved this, he argues that the second claim – the requirement for appellees to provide an SSN – becomes moot or unripe. Since the government already has the number, there is nothing in the record to suggest Roy will be under a further obligation to “provide” it, and the government itself suggested mootness once the SSN's existence was known. He suggests that if other applicants receive exceptions or special assistance for difficulties in providing information (e.g., those with mental, physical, or linguistic handicaps), a religious inability should receive no less deference. He cautions against addressing hypothetical constitutional questions not squarely presented by the record or factual findings.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice O’Connor
Agrees the government can use the existing SSN. Dissents from the majority's standard for furnishing the SSN, arguing the compelling interest test applies, and the government has not met it. Justice O'Connor joins Parts I and II of the Chief Justice’s opinion, agreeing that the government should not be enjoined from using or disseminating the SSN it already possesses. She rejects the Chief Justice's proposed new standard of "reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest" for conditions on government benefits, stating it has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to minimal scrutiny. Instead, she asserts that the long-standing "compelling governmental interest" and "least restrictive means" test from Wisconsin v. Yoder, United States v. Lee, Thomas, and Sherbert should apply. She argues that denying an exemption for a sincere religious belief, when the government’s interest in preventing welfare fraud could be served by less restrictive means (e.g., using existing identification data like full name, date of birth, and parents' names), is not justified. Administrative inconvenience alone, she contends, is insufficient to justify a burden on free exercise, especially when few similar claims are expected. She emphasizes that the fact that benefits are sought, rather than penalties imposed, does not change the constitutional standard, citing Goldberg v. Kelly and Sherbert.
Analysis:
This case significantly altered the landscape of Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence by establishing a lower standard of review for neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice, particularly when related to conditions for government benefits. By distinguishing between direct government compulsion (which might still trigger strict scrutiny) and indirect burdens (denial of benefits), the Court effectively carved out an exception to the "compelling interest" and "least restrictive means" test previously applied in cases like Sherbert and Yoder. This shift made it easier for the government to justify regulations that impose burdens on religious practice, signaling a weakening of Free Exercise protections against broadly applicable laws, a trend that would culminate in Employment Division v. Smith.
