Bowen v. Cochran

Court of Appeals of Georgia
556 S.E.2d 530 (2001)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Questions of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are for the jury to decide and a directed verdict is improper so long as there is some conflict in the evidence regarding a material issue from which a jury could reasonably draw a conclusion.

Facts:

David Bowen had previously purchased two other gas cookers from manufacturer Fred Cochran.
Bowen purchased a third cooker, and Cochran provided him with a trigger lighter and verbal instructions on how to light it properly.
Cochran observed Bowen lighting the cooker improperly on at least one occasion and corrected him.
While using the third cooker at home, Bowen lit it with rolled-up newspaper and went inside for approximately 30 minutes.
Upon returning, Bowen found the flame had extinguished. He turned off the gas, opened the lid, and waited a few minutes for the gas smell to dissipate.
Bowen made two unsuccessful attempts to relight the cooker with lit newspaper.
On the third attempt, as Bowen bent over to look inside, the cooker exploded in a burst of flame, severely burning his hands and forearms.

Procedural Posture:

David R. Bowen sued Fred Cochran and Classy Cooker Manufacturer’s, Inc. in a trial court for personal injuries.
The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Classy Cooker Manufacturer’s, Inc.
At the conclusion of evidence in the trial against Cochran, Bowen moved for a directed verdict on the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence.
The trial court denied Bowen's motions.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Fred Cochran.
Bowen (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motions and instructing the jury on the defenses.

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Issue:

Did the trial court err in denying the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict by finding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to consider the affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence?

Opinions:

Majority - Miller, Judge

No, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict. A directed verdict is only proper where there is no conflict in the evidence, but here, there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Bowen assumed the risk and was contributorily negligent. Cochran testified that he instructed Bowen on the proper lighting procedure, yet Bowen chose to use newspaper, had previously lit the cooker improperly, and left it unattended for 30 minutes. This evidence, though disputed, created a question of fact for the jury as to whether Bowen had actual knowledge of the danger, understood the risk, and voluntarily exposed himself to it. Because there was some evidence to support the affirmative defenses, the issues were properly submitted to the jury.

Dissenting - Eldridge, Judge

Yes, the trial court erred. The affirmative defense of assumption of the risk was not properly raised in the pleadings, and more importantly, the evidence failed to support it. To assume a risk, a plaintiff must have actual and subjective knowledge of the specific, particular risk of harm that caused the injury, not just a general awareness of danger. There was no evidence that Bowen knew of the cooker's specific design defect—that it allowed gas to pool and had a delayed ignition—which was the proximate cause of the explosion. At most, Bowen's actions constituted contributory negligence, not a voluntary assumption of a known, specific risk.

Dissenting - Barnes, Judge

Yes, the trial court erred in denying the directed verdict and charging the jury on assumption of risk. The 'watchword' of assumption of risk is knowledge of the specific risk. There was no evidence that Bowen knew the cooker was defectively designed in a way that caused gas to pool and not dissipate, leading to an explosion. The defendant failed to show that using newspaper instead of the provided lighter was the cause of the explosion or that Bowen was warned of this specific danger. For Bowen to have assumed the risk, he must have known about the specific defect and chosen to proceed despite that knowledge, which the evidence does not support.

Analysis:

This case illustrates the often-blurry line between assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and it sets a relatively low evidentiary bar for defendants to get an assumption of risk defense before a jury in Georgia. The majority held that any evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge and appreciation of risk is sufficient, even if circumstantial. The dissents argue for a stricter standard, requiring proof that the plaintiff knew of the specific defect or danger that caused the harm, not just a general risk. This ruling makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to defeat an assumption of risk defense via directed verdict, shifting more power to the jury to decide based on the plaintiff's conduct.

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