Bowen v. Chase
25 L. Ed. 47, 98 U.S. 254, 1878 U.S. LEXIS 1385 (1878)
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Rule of Law:
Declarations of a person in possession of real property which characterize the nature of their possession and are against their proprietary interest are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Such statements can be used as evidence against the declarant and those claiming title through them.
Facts:
- Stephen Jumel originally owned all the real property in question in New York City.
- In 1826, Stephen Jumel gave his wife, Eliza B. Jumel (Madame Jumel), a general power of attorney to manage and sell his real estate.
- In 1827 and 1828, Madame Jumel used this power of attorney to convey most of the properties to their adopted daughter, Mary Jumel Bownes.
- Mary then conveyed the properties to a trustee, to be held for Madame Jumel for life, with a remainder for Stephen Jumel for life, and a final remainder in fee to Mary.
- Stephen Jumel returned from France in 1828 and lived on the property with his family until his death in 1832.
- While living on the property in 1828, Stephen Jumel told a witness that his wife had sold all the property, but they had a settlement whereby the entire estate would ultimately go to Mary.
- After Madame Jumel died in 1865, George W. Bowen claimed to be her illegitimate son and heir, and sued to eject Mary's husband, Nelson Chase, and their children from the properties, including a 65-acre tract for which no conveyance deed was found.
Procedural Posture:
- George W. Bowen brought an action of ejectment against Nelson Chase and others in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.
- The case was tried before a jury in October 1872.
- Over the plaintiff's objection, the trial court admitted testimony from a witness detailing statements made by Stephen Jumel concerning the property's ownership.
- At the conclusion of the evidence, both parties agreed to submit the question of Madame Jumel's title to the judge to decide as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts.
- The presiding judge directed the jury to return a special finding that Eliza B. Jumel had no descendible estate or interest in the lands claimed at the time of her death.
- George W. Bowen, the plaintiff, appealed the judgment against him to the U.S. Supreme Court, assigning error to the evidentiary ruling and the directed verdict.
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Issue:
Are the declarations of a former owner of real property, who remains in possession, admissible as evidence to characterize the nature of his possession and establish a family settlement that limits his title, even for property not covered by existing deeds?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Bradley
Yes, such declarations are admissible as evidence. The court held that Stephen Jumel's statements were admissible because he was in possession of the property at the time they were made. The declarations were against his proprietary interest, as he admitted his absolute title was gone and that the property had been settled for the ultimate benefit of his adopted daughter. These statements served to explain the character of his possession. Given that both parties agreed to submit the question of title to the judge as a matter of law on the undisputed evidence, which included these declarations, the judge's conclusion that Madame Jumel had no descendible interest was correct.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms a key exception to the hearsay rule for declarations against proprietary interest made by a person in possession of property. It solidifies the principle that possession is a critical predicate for admitting such statements to explain the nature of one's title. The ruling is significant for property disputes, particularly those involving complex family settlements, as it allows courts to consider parol evidence to clarify ownership where written instruments are ambiguous or missing. This precedent strengthens the evidentiary value of an owner's statements that limit their own title, binding those who later claim under them.
