Bowen v. Baumgardner
491 P.2d 1301, 6 Wash. App. 18, 1971 Wash. App. LEXIS 1228 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
The violation of a safety statute constitutes negligence per se, but this presumption can be rebutted by evidence of a legally sufficient excuse or justification. The reasonableness of a claimed excuse or justification presents a question of fact for the jury, precluding summary judgment.
Facts:
- Defendants Hobart lived near a T-intersection in Seattle where a sign on a telephone pole indicated 'No Parking 4-6 PM'.
- It was a customary practice for motorists, including the Hobarts and even police officers, to park in that location outside of the prohibited hours.
- On the morning of March 2, 1968, the Hobarts parked their car in this spot, which was within 20 feet of an unmarked pedestrian crosswalk, in violation of a state statute.
- A 6-year-old child, the plaintiff, began to cross the street by walking out from in front of the Hobarts' parked car.
- The child did not look to the west before running into the street.
- Mrs. Baumgardner, driving eastbound, could not see the child because the illegally parked Hobart vehicle obstructed her view, and she struck the child with her car.
Procedural Posture:
- The minor plaintiff sued defendants Hobart for negligence in a Washington state trial court.
- The Hobarts filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were not negligent as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted the Hobarts' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claim against them.
- The plaintiff (appellant) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
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Issue:
Does evidence of a potential excuse or justification for violating a traffic statute, such as reliance on a confusing parking sign and local custom, create a genuine issue of material fact for a jury regarding negligence, thereby precluding summary judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Horowitz, C.J.
Yes. While the unexcused violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se, the existence of a lawful excuse or justification may prevent such a finding. The Hobarts violated a statute by parking within 20 feet of a crosswalk, but they presented evidence of an excuse: their reliance on a 'No Parking 4-6 PM' sign and the common practice of parking there. Although motorists are expected to obey even de facto traffic signs, this sign merely permitted, but did not require, parking in that specific location. The Hobarts still had a common-law duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting a parking place so as not to create a danger to others. Whether their reliance on the sign and custom was reasonable, given the car's effect of blocking the view of a crosswalk, is a question of fact for a jury to decide, not a judge on summary judgment.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that negligence per se is not an absolute, strict liability doctrine. It clarifies that a defendant can introduce evidence of an excuse or justification, such as reliance on a misleading traffic sign or an established local custom, to rebut the presumption of negligence. By deeming the reasonableness of such an excuse a question of fact, the ruling makes it more difficult for parties to obtain summary judgment in cases involving statutory violations where a plausible justification exists. This promotes jury determination of what constitutes reasonable care under the specific circumstances of a case.
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