Bouie v. City of Columbia
378 U.S. 347 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state's highest court from retroactively applying an unforeseeable judicial construction of a criminal statute to punish conduct that was not criminal at the time it was committed, as this fails to provide fair warning.
Facts:
- Eckerd's Drug Store in Columbia, South Carolina, served Black and white customers in all departments except for its restaurant and lunch counter, which were reserved for white customers only.
- On March 14, 1960, two Black college students, petitioners Bouie and another, entered Eckerd's and sat in a booth at the segregated lunch counter to be served.
- At the time of their entry, there were no signs or notices prohibiting their entry into the restaurant department.
- After the petitioners were seated, a store employee placed a 'no trespassing' sign and a chain.
- The store manager and, subsequently, the Assistant Chief of Police, asked the petitioners to leave.
- The petitioners refused to leave and continued to sit quietly in the booth.
- The operative South Carolina trespass statute, § 16-386, criminalized 'entry upon the lands of another... after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry.'
- Petitioners were arrested by the police after their refusal to leave.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners Bouie and another were charged with criminal trespass in violation of South Carolina Code § 16-386.
- They were tried and convicted in the Recorder's Court of Columbia, a trial court.
- Petitioners appealed their convictions to the County Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the state's highest court, which also affirmed the convictions.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the retroactive application by a state supreme court of an unforeseeable judicial construction of a criminal trespass statute, which expands the statute's scope from prohibiting only 'entry after notice' to also include 'remaining after notice,' violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes, the retroactive application of an unforeseeable judicial construction of a criminal statute violates the Due Process Clause. A criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. The South Carolina statute, by its plain language, prohibited only the act of 'entry upon the lands of another ... after notice ... prohibiting such entry.' The petitioners entered the store and the lunch counter lawfully, without any prior notice. The South Carolina Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation—that the statute also covered the separate act of 'remaining on the premises after receiving notice to leave'—was an unforeseeable and retroactive expansion. Such a judicial enlargement of a criminal statute operates like an ex post facto law, which is forbidden, and deprives the petitioners of their due process right to fair notice that their conduct was criminal at the time it occurred. Prior state case law had consistently interpreted the statute to require notice before entry, and the state court's reliance on principles from civil trespass law was insufficient to provide warning in the criminal context.
Dissenting - Justice Black
No, the application of the statute does not violate the Due Process Clause. The South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation was not unforeseeable. It has long been the common law of South Carolina that a person who enters property by invitation becomes a trespasser if they refuse to leave when asked. Therefore, construing the criminal trespass statute to include remaining on property after a request to leave is a reasonable and foreseeable interpretation. The petitioners could not have been genuinely misled by the statute's language into believing they could remain on private property against the owner's explicit orders without being guilty of trespass.
Analysis:
This decision significantly broadens the 'fair warning' doctrine under the Due Process Clause, extending it from facially vague statutes to encompass unforeseeable judicial interpretations of precise statutes. It establishes that a state judiciary cannot accomplish retroactively what a legislature is barred from doing via an ex post facto law. This precedent strengthens due process protections against judicial activism that retroactively criminalizes conduct, ensuring that liability is based on the law as it was clearly understood at the time of the act. The case serves as a crucial check on the power of courts to radically reinterpret criminal law and apply those new interpretations to past events.
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