Bosley v. Andrews
393 Pa. 161, 1958 Pa. LEXIS 337, 142 A.2d 263 (1958)
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Rule of Law:
In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff cannot recover damages for injuries resulting from fright, nervous shock, or emotional distress unless they are accompanied by a contemporaneous physical injury or physical impact.
Facts:
- Defendant Dale Andrews' cattle repeatedly trespassed on the farm of plaintiffs Mary Louise and Oliver Bosley.
- On April 10, 1950, Andrews' cattle, accompanied by a Hereford bull, again trespassed onto the Bosley farm.
- Mary Louise Bosley went outside to assist her daughter in driving the cattle away.
- The bull lowered its head and charged at Mrs. Bosley from a distance of approximately 25 feet.
- In terror, Mrs. Bosley started to run but collapsed and fainted before the bull could reach her.
- The bull never made physical contact with Mrs. Bosley; it was diverted by a dog and came no closer than about 25 feet.
- The fright from the incident triggered an attack of coronary insufficiency (a heart attack).
- Medical experts testified that while Mrs. Bosley had a pre-existing arteriosclerosis, the fright was the 'trigger mechanism' that precipitated her heart attack and subsequent disability.
Procedural Posture:
- Oliver and Mary Louise Bosley sued Dale Andrews in a Pennsylvania trial court.
- A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for damage to their crops.
- The trial judge entered a compulsory nonsuit (similar to a directed verdict) against the plaintiffs on the claims for Mrs. Bosley's personal injuries.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, appealed the nonsuit to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The plaintiffs, as appellants, petitioned for and were granted an appeal (allocatur) to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the state's highest court.
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Issue:
Under Pennsylvania law, can a plaintiff recover damages for a physical disability, such as a heart attack, that results solely from fright or nervous shock, without any accompanying physical impact from the defendant's negligent act?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Bell
No. There can be no recovery of damages for injuries resulting from fright or nervous shock unless they are accompanied by physical injury or physical impact. The long-established rule in Pennsylvania, known as the impact rule, bars recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress that is not accompanied by a physical impact. The court reasons that abandoning this rule would 'open a Pandora’s box' of litigation, encouraging a 'tremendous number of illusory or imaginative or ‘faked’' claims. Citing precedents such as Ewing v. Pittsburgh C. & St. L. Ry. Co. and Koplin v. Liggett Co., the court emphasizes that allowing recovery for fright alone would lead to speculative and untrustworthy claims that medical science could not reliably disprove, creating a danger to the cause of practical justice.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Musmanno
Yes. A plaintiff should be able to recover for genuine physical injuries proximately caused by a defendant's negligence, even in the absence of a physical impact. The majority's adherence to the impact rule is an outdated and unjust policy based on an exaggerated fear of fraudulent claims, which demonstrates a lack of faith in the judicial system's ability to discern truth. The dissent argues that Mrs. Bosley's heart condition is a tangible, physical injury, not mere emotional distress, and modern medical science can reliably establish causation. Furthermore, the rule creates absurd distinctions where recovery is allowed for trivial impacts but denied for severe, life-altering injuries caused by terror, and it is illogical to allow recovery for fright-induced damage to an animal but not a human.
Analysis:
This case is a classic affirmation of the traditional 'impact rule' for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). The majority's decision illustrates the strong policy concerns—fear of fraudulent claims and limitless liability—that historically underpinned this restrictive doctrine. The powerful dissent by Justice Musmanno highlights the growing criticism of the rule as being out of step with modern medical understanding and notions of justice, foreshadowing the eventual shift in many jurisdictions toward more liberal standards like the 'zone of danger' test. The case solidifies Pennsylvania's adherence to the impact rule at the time and serves as a key example of the jurisprudential conflict between legal certainty and compensating genuine harm.
