Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2073, 1995 WL 34201, 45 F.3d 780 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), a district court lacks the authority to remand an entire case, including federal question claims, to state court unless the federal claims are "separate and independent" from the state law claims. Claims arising from a common nucleus of operative fact are not separate and independent for the purposes of this statute.
Facts:
- In September 1991, Alan Lindsey and Randall Coughanour were involved in a dispute with security guards at an indoor shopping mall, during which they were allegedly harassed, threatened, and assaulted.
- Lindsey and Coughanour called the West Mifflin Police Department for assistance, and Officer Evan responded.
- Officer Evan refused to take action against the guards and instead ordered Lindsey and Coughanour to leave the mall and not return, under threat of arrest.
- Over the next three weeks, Lindsey unsuccessfully attempted to contact the mall manager to understand why they were banned.
- On September 27, 1991, Lindsey and Coughanour returned to the mall to shop and were accosted, handcuffed, and taken to the mall security office.
- Officer Evan arrived and issued them summary offense citations for disorderly conduct and defiant trespass.
- Lindsey and Coughanour were photographed with a 'DEFIANT TRESPASS' form, which was then displayed on a public bulletin board in the mall's security office.
- They were subsequently prosecuted and convicted on charges stemming from the incident, but a state appellate court later vacated these convictions.
Procedural Posture:
- Lindsey and Coughanour were prosecuted and convicted on criminal charges in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas (a state trial court).
- A three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (a state intermediate appellate court) vacated the convictions.
- Lindsey and Coughanour filed a civil complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania against the Borough of West Mifflin, Officer Evan, and the mall owners.
- The complaint alleged state law tort claims and a federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The municipal defendants (the Borough and Officer Evan) removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania based on federal question jurisdiction.
- The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court.
- A U.S. Magistrate Judge recommended that the district court remand the entire case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), finding that state law predominated.
- The District Judge adopted the recommendation and issued an order remanding the entire case to state court.
- The municipal defendants then petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus to compel the District Judge to retain jurisdiction over the case.
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Issue:
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) authorize a district court to remand an entire case, including federal question claims, back to state court when the state law claims predominate but are not separate and independent from the federal claims?
Opinions:
Majority - Pratt, Circuit Judge
No. A district court is not authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) to remand an entire action, including the federal claims that form the basis for removal, unless the federal claims are 'separate and independent' from the state law claims. The court reasoned that § 1441(c) is a limited grant of authority that applies only when a removable 'separate and independent' federal question claim is joined with non-removable state claims. Citing American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, the court explained that claims are not separate and independent if they arise from a single wrong or an interrelated series of events. Here, the plaintiffs' federal § 1983 claim and their state law claims for malicious prosecution, assault, and conspiracy all arose from the same series of events at the mall. Therefore, the federal claim was not separate and independent, and the district court had no authority under § 1441(c) to remand any part of the case. The court also rejected the argument that the remand could be justified under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), clarifying that this statute only allows a court to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, not to remand claims over which it has original federal question jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the narrow scope of remand authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) following its 1990 amendment. It establishes that the 'separate and independent' claim requirement remains a strict prerequisite, preventing district courts from remanding an entire case simply because state law issues predominate. The ruling reinforces the principle that federal courts have a duty to exercise jurisdiction properly conferred upon them, particularly in civil rights cases. By distinguishing the remand power in § 1441(c) from the discretionary power to decline supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(c), the court prevents the conflation of these statutes and preserves a defendant's statutory right to a federal forum for federal claims that are factually intertwined with state claims.
