No, the promise is not a real contract and can't be enforced. When you get married, you legally agree to support your spouse, which includes caring for them when they are sick. Since Hildegard already had a duty to care for Michael, her promise to do so wasn't a new bargain. You can't get paid for doing something you're already legally supposed to do. The court felt that allowing spouses to make business deals about caregiving would undermine the special nature of marriage.

Yes, the promise should be enforced. The rule the court is using is old-fashioned and comes from a time when wives were seen as their husbands' property. Today, a spouse's duty to 'care' for the other could just mean hiring a nurse. By giving up her own life to provide personal, hands-on care, Hildegard did much more than the bare minimum required by law. That extra effort was a valid part of a bargain, and Michael's estate should have to honor his promise.

The court said no, Hildegard can't get the extra properties. They decided that because spouses are supposed to take care of each other, Hildegard doing so doesn't mean she should get extra property. The court said that taking care of your spouse when they're sick is part of what you agree to do when you get married, so you can't make a separate agreement about it. They also said that allowing these kinds of agreements could cause problems in marriages and might be used to trick other people who are owed money.

One judge disagreed and said yes, Hildegard should be able to get the properties. He thinks that the agreement should count because it involved more than what is normally expected in a marriage. He said that times have changed, and marriages are different now than they used to be. He also pointed out that spouses can sue each other for other things, so they should be able to make agreements like this too. He thinks it's unfair to say married people can't make these kinds of agreements when unmarried people can.

No. A contract in which one spouse agrees to pay the other for providing personal nursing care is unenforceable because it lacks valid consideration and violates public policy. The marital contract itself imposes a legal duty of mutual support on spouses, which includes providing care for a sick partner. Performing a pre-existing legal duty does not constitute new consideration sufficient to support a separate contract. The court reasoned that the duty of spousal support is a fundamental, personal obligation inherent in the marital relationship, encompassing not just financial aid but also companionship, comfort, and care. Upholding such 'sickbed bargaining' would be antithetical to the institution of marriage as defined by the legislature. This long-standing rule, established in cases like *Estate of Sonnicksen*, remains valid and applies equally to both spouses in modern law.

Yes. The contract should be enforceable because the wife provided consideration beyond her pre-existing marital duties. The rule voiding such contracts is based on the archaic and obsolete common law doctrine of coverture, which viewed a wife's services as her husband's property. In modern society, the marital duty of support can be fulfilled in various ways, such as by hiring a professional nurse. By forgoing her own independence and opportunities to personally provide round-the-clock care—a service she was not legally required to perform *personally*—the wife provided something of value beyond the scope of her marital duty. Spouses should have the freedom to contract with each other, and refusing to enforce this agreement makes less sense than enforcing reconciliation agreements made upon separation. The court should not rely on outdated sentiment to limit the contractual freedom of competent adults.

No. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Perley, holds that interspousal agreements for compensation for personal care are void against public policy because such duties are inherent to the marital relationship and do not constitute new consideration. The court emphasized the non-delegable and personal nature of marital support obligations, underscoring that personal performance of these duties does not create a new consideration supporting the alleged indebtedness. The court reasoned that marital duties are owed by the spouses personally and cannot be delegated to a third party. The majority also rejected the argument that the rule denying compensation for support is outdated, stating that the potential for fraud still exists and that the institution of marriage continues to be defined by statute as a personal relationship of mutual support.

Yes. Justice Poché dissented, arguing that the majority's view is outdated and ignores modern realities where spouses may negotiate personal care agreements. He contends that such agreements should be enforceable as they provide valid consideration not inherently covered by marital duties, especially when one spouse offers property in exchange for personal care that goes beyond general spousal support obligations. Poché argues that the doctrinal base for the majority's opinion has been discarded long ago, and that modern attitudes toward marriage have changed. He emphasizes that the law now allows civil actions between spouses for intentional or negligent torts and breached contracts. Poché also points out that the fear of fraud should not bar an entire category of interspousal litigation, as the judiciary is capable of dealing with such issues on a case-by-case basis.

Borelli v. Brusseau

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