Borel v. Young
989 So. 2d 42 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
The specific suspension of prescription provisions within the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA) exclusively govern the timeliness of claims against joint tortfeasors, superseding the general Civil Code rule regarding the interruption of prescription. Filing a lawsuit against one qualified healthcare provider does not interrupt the prescriptive period for other joint tortfeasor healthcare providers who were part of the same medical review panel proceeding.
Facts:
- In April 1999, an ultrasound revealed an abdominal mass in Mary Borel.
- Mary Borel's internist, Dr. Clinton Young, referred her to Dr. Aldy Castor for surgical evaluation.
- On August 19, 1999, Dr. Castor performed surgery on Mrs. Borel at Lafayette General Medical Center (LGMC).
- On August 20, 1999, Mrs. Borel's condition deteriorated significantly, and she was diagnosed with congestive heart failure, eventually suffering from multiple organ failure.
- Mrs. Borel was transferred to a long-term care facility on October 15, 1999, where she remained until her death on May 23, 2000.
- On February 17, 2005, during a deposition of an expert witness for LGMC, Mrs. Borel's family (the Borels) learned for the first time that this expert would testify that Dr. Young's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care.
Procedural Posture:
- Minos Borel and his children (the Borels) filed a medical malpractice claim with the Patient Compensation Fund against Dr. Young, Dr. Castor, and LGMC on August 14, 2000.
- On January 17, 2002, a medical review panel issued an opinion finding no breach of the standard of care.
- The Borels sued LGMC in state district court (trial court) on March 28, 2002, but did not name Dr. Young as a defendant.
- On March 21, 2005, the Borels filed a separate lawsuit against Dr. Young and his insurer, LAMMICO.
- Dr. Young filed a peremptory exception of prescription, arguing the claim was time-barred.
- The district court granted the exception, dismissing the claim against Dr. Young, finding it was perempted by the three-year limit in La.Rev.Stat. § 9:5628.
- The Borels (appellants) appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, where Dr. Young was the appellee.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal but on different grounds, finding the claim had prescribed because the specific suspension rules of the Medical Malpractice Act controlled over general interruption rules.
- The Borels (applicants) successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of Louisiana for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Do the specific provisions for suspension of prescription in the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act exclusively govern claims against joint tortfeasors, thereby precluding the application of the general civil code rule that filing suit against one joint tortfeasor interrupts prescription against all others?
Opinions:
Majority - Weimer, J. (on rehearing)
Yes. The more specific provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act regarding suspension of prescription against joint tortfeasors apply to the exclusion of the general code articles on interruption of prescription. The court first reversed its original opinion which held the three-year statutory limit was peremptive, reaffirming its precedent in Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hospital that both the one-year and three-year periods in La.Rev.Stat. § 9:5628 are prescriptive. However, applying the rule from LeBreton v. Rabito, the court held that where a specific statute (the LMMA) conflicts with a general one (the Civil Code), the specific statute controls. The LMMA provides a specific mechanism for suspending prescription against all joint tortfeasors during the medical review panel process, which the legislature intended to be the exclusive method for tolling the statute of limitations in malpractice cases. Therefore, the Borels' timely suit against LGMC did not interrupt prescription against Dr. Young; prescription was only suspended during the panel review, and the suit filed against Dr. Young years later was untimely.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Calogero, C.J.
No. While concurring that the three-year limitation is prescriptive, the dissent argues that the majority incorrectly extended the holding of LeBreton v. Rabito beyond its unique facts. The dissent would find that the general rule on interruption of prescription should apply, meaning the timely suit against the hospital, as a joint tortfeasor, should have interrupted prescription against the physicians, making the subsequent suit against them timely.
Concurring - Knoll, J.
This opinion concurs only in the result of dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. It adheres to the reasoning of the original majority opinion (authored by Justice Knoll), which found that the three-year time limitation in La.Rev.Stat. § 9:5628 is peremptive, not prescriptive. Therefore, the claim was not merely barred but was completely extinguished after three years, making it impossible to revive through interruption or any other means.
Concurring - Traylor, J.
This opinion concurs only in the result. It agrees with Justice Knoll that the three-year period is peremptive and that Hebert v. Doctors Memorial Hosp. was wrongly decided. However, since the majority's reasoning on rehearing reaches the same result (dismissal), the disagreement over the prescriptive versus peremptive nature of the statute is academic for this case's outcome.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act as a lex specialis, a special statutory scheme that displaces general tort law principles concerning statutes of limitations. It establishes that plaintiffs cannot rely on the general rule of interrupting prescription against joint tortfeasors by suing only one party. This holding significantly narrows the window for adding defendants post-panel review compared to general tort litigation, forcing plaintiffs' counsel to sue all potentially liable healthcare providers within the specific timeframe calculated under the Act's suspension rules, rather than relying on the relation-back of claims against joint tortfeasors.
