Bordenkircher v. Hayes
434 U.S. 357 (1978)
Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a state prosecutor carries out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause for the more serious charge.
Facts:
- Paul Lewis Hayes was indicted for uttering a forged instrument for $88.30, an offense punishable by two to ten years in prison.
- Hayes had two prior felony convictions, making him eligible for a life sentence under Kentucky's Habitual Criminal Act.
- During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to recommend a five-year sentence if Hayes pleaded guilty to the forgery charge.
- The prosecutor explicitly warned that if Hayes refused the offer and insisted on going to trial, he would seek a new indictment under the Habitual Criminal Act, which would result in a mandatory life sentence upon conviction.
- Hayes rejected the plea offer and maintained his innocence.
- Following Hayes's rejection, the prosecutor obtained a new indictment charging Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act.
- The prosecutor possessed the evidence of Hayes's prior convictions at the time of the original indictment.
Procedural Posture:
- Hayes was tried and convicted by a jury in a Kentucky state trial court on the charges of uttering a forged instrument and being a habitual offender.
- The trial court sentenced Hayes to the mandatory term of life in prison.
- Hayes appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Hayes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, which was denied.
- Hayes (appellant) appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the prosecutor's conduct had violated Hayes's due process rights.
- The warden, Bordenkircher (petitioner), was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a state prosecutor from carrying out a threat made during plea negotiations to reindict an accused on a more serious, but legally justified, charge if the accused refuses to plead guilty to the original offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by the prosecutor's conduct in this case. The Court distinguished this situation from cases of prosecutorial vindictiveness, such as North Carolina v. Pearce and Blackledge v. Perry, where the state unilaterally imposed a penalty on a defendant for exercising a legal right like an appeal. In the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is fully informed of the terms of the offer and is free to accept or reject it. Confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment is a permissible and inevitable attribute of a system that tolerates and encourages plea negotiations. So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense, the charging decision rests in his discretion and using that discretion to induce a guilty plea is a legitimate part of the bargaining process.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The prosecutor's conduct violated the Due Process Clause. The principles against vindictiveness established in Pearce and Perry should apply here. The prosecutor admitted that the sole reason for the more serious indictment was to discourage the defendant from exercising his right to a trial, which is the very definition of vindictiveness. There is little difference between vindictiveness after a defendant attacks a conviction and vindictiveness during plea negotiations; the Due Process Clause should protect an accused against it regardless of the context. The majority's decision effectively gives plea bargaining full sway despite clear evidence of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Dissenting - Justice Powell
Yes. While prosecutors must have wide discretion, the conduct in this specific case violated due process. The prosecutor's admitted purpose was to penalize the respondent's exercise of his constitutional rights. The initial prosecutorial judgment was that it was not in the public interest to seek a life sentence for an $88 forgery. Escalating the charge to a mandatory life sentence solely because the defendant insisted on a trial is an unconstitutional exercise of discretion. This is an exceptional case where the prosecutor's purpose is not in doubt, and the implementation of a strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional rights is not constitutionally permissible.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the constitutional legitimacy of using charging discretion as a powerful tool in plea bargaining. It distinguishes the pretrial plea negotiation context from post-conviction scenarios, holding that threatening more severe (but legally justified) charges is not the type of 'prosecutorial vindictiveness' prohibited by earlier precedents. This ruling significantly empowers prosecutors by allowing them to present defendants with stark, 'unpleasant alternatives,' thereby increasing the pressure to plead guilty. The case reinforces the view of plea bargaining as a 'market' or contract-like negotiation where defendants, advised by counsel, are expected to make strategic choices based on risk assessment.
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