Borchers v. Hrychuk

Majority - Paul E. Alpert

No, the circuit court did not err in dismissing Dale Borchers's claims. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissals of Borchers's claims for several reasons. First, regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court held that Hyrchuk's alleged conduct, while reprehensible, was not sufficiently 'extreme and outrageous' to meet the stringent requirements of the tort. The court distinguished this case from previous rulings like Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel where an officially-sanctioned professional treatment relationship (e.g., licensed psychologist-patient) was present. The absence of such a formal, professional relationship meant Hyrchuk's actions, though an abuse of an informal position, did not rise to the level of outrageousness required by law. Second, concerning the marital counseling malpractice claim, the court found Borchers's allegations insufficient to establish a professional counselor-patient relationship. While Borchers alleged Hyrchuk received counseling training and held himself out as suitable for marital counseling, the complaint lacked specific details regarding the type and extent of this training, official church recognition or certification of the program, or government licensing. Without such details, a professional duty of care could not be established as in Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital. Third, the court declined to recognize the tort of clergy malpractice in Maryland. As an intermediate appellate court, it stated its primary function is to correct error, not to create new substantive legal rules without precedent from the Court of Appeals or legislative mandate. Furthermore, recognizing such a tort would require courts to define standards of care for clergy, which would involve interpreting diverse religious beliefs and practices, raising significant First Amendment concerns regarding the free exercise of religion, as discussed in F.G. v. MacDonell. Finally, the gross negligence claim was properly dismissed because it merely restated the previously dismissed marital counseling malpractice and clergy malpractice claims. The court also clarified that Borchers did not abandon claims dismissed 'with prejudice' by filing an amended complaint that only included claims for which leave to amend was granted, thereby preserving those dismissed claims for appeal (except for the negligent hiring claim, which she explicitly waived).