Booker, Inc. v. Morrill

Majority - Rucker, Judge

Yes, Indiana's Comparative Fault Act permits an intoxicated driver to recover damages from an alcohol provider for self-inflicted injuries, even if the driver's conduct was willful and wanton, and such conduct does not qualify as an "intentional act" excluded from the Act unless there is evidence of a deliberate intent to cause the specific injury. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for Morrill. First, the court addressed Booker's argument that driving while intoxicated constitutes willful and wanton misconduct, which should bar recovery. It acknowledged that pre-Comparative Fault Act cases (effective January 1, 1985) did hold this to be a complete defense (Davis v. Stinson; Kolkman v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.). However, the Comparative Fault Act eliminated the concept of certain degrees of negligence operating as a complete bar, instead requiring comparison of all fault, including reckless, willful, or wanton conduct (Robbins v. McCarthy). Therefore, Morrill's conduct, even if willful and wanton, could not completely bar recovery under the Act. Second, the court rejected Booker's public policy argument against recovery for self-inflicted injuries by an intoxicated driver. It reiterated that public policy determination rests with the legislative bodies, and the legislature's enactment of the Comparative Fault Act demonstrated a clear intent to apply comparative treatment to a broad range of negligent and willful/wanton conduct, valuing a relative assessment of fault (Robbins). Third, the court addressed Booker's claim that Morrill's actions were intentional and thus excluded from the Comparative Fault Act. The Act explicitly excludes "intentional acts" (Ind.Code § 34-4-33-2(a)). The court clarified that intentional acts involve desired consequences or consequences the actor believes are certain or substantially certain to follow (Dickison v. Hargitt citing Robbins). The focus is not on the voluntarilless of drinking and driving, but on whether Morrill deliberately engaged in the conduct leading to the crash, such as driving off the road and hitting the house. Since no evidence suggested Morrill intended to crash, and evidence indicated severe impairment or unconsciousness, his actions were not considered "intentional" under the Act. Fourth, the court found sufficient evidence to establish that Booker had actual knowledge of Morrill's visible intoxication. Under Indiana Code § 7.1-5-10-15.5(b), an alcohol provider is liable only if they had actual knowledge of visible intoxication and the intoxication was a proximate cause. Actual knowledge can be proven by indirect or circumstantial evidence (Muex v. Hindel Bowling Lanes, Inc.; Gariup Construction Co., Inc. v. Foster). Factors considered include consumption amount, time involved, behavior, and condition shortly after leaving (Ashlock v. Norris). Dr. Evans' expert testimony (that a .21% BAC would manifest physical signs) served as circumstantial evidence, and the trial court was free to credit this over eyewitness testimony denying visible intoxication. Fifth, the court found sufficient evidence of proximate cause. Proximate cause is generally a question of fact (Adams Township v. Sturdevant). The trier of fact could reasonably infer that Morrill's intoxication so impaired his driving ability that he lost control of his vehicle, leading to his death (Orville Milk Co. v. Beller). Finally, the court upheld the admission of Morrill's blood-alcohol content. This evidence was relevant to proving that Morrill was visibly intoxicated when served and that the bartenders knew of his intoxication, thus having a logical tendency to prove a material fact (Valinet v. Eskew). The trial judge's discretion in admitting relevant evidence was not abused.