Bonura v. Bonura
505 So. 2d 143 (1987)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Adultery, as grounds for divorce under Louisiana law, is not limited to actual sexual intercourse but includes other repeated acts of intimate sexual contact, and a defendant's admissions of sexually suggestive acts, when corroborated by other independent evidence, can be considered sufficient proof of adultery.
Facts:
- Rocco Frank Bonura, Jr. and Loretta Alfonso Bonura were married on June 30, 1984.
- In early 1986, Loretta reestablished contact and communication with her former husband, Don Dakin.
- Loretta frequently saw Dakin, stayed at his home overnight on occasions, and took a weekend trip to Mobile, Alabama with him where they shared a room at the Hilton Hotel.
- In February 1986, Loretta told Rocco that she was falling in love with Dakin, and Rocco claimed she admitted to having sexual intercourse with Dakin on numerous occasions.
- Loretta later admitted in court that she and Dakin shared the same bed, touched each other's sexual organs, that they laid on top of one another, and that Dakin's sex organs may have come close to or touched hers, but she vehemently denied actual sexual intercourse.
- A witness, Preston Davis, testified he saw Loretta embracing and kissing another man (not Rocco) in the street after a Mardi Gras parade.
- Rocco introduced photographs into evidence showing Loretta and Dakin together in Mobile, kissing and hugging.
Procedural Posture:
- Rocco Frank Bonura, Jr. filed a lawsuit against Loretta Alfonso Bonura in a Louisiana trial court, seeking a divorce on the grounds of adultery.
- The trial court granted a judgment of divorce in favor of Rocco Frank Bonura, Jr., finding Loretta Alfonso Bonura guilty of adultery.
- Loretta Alfonso Bonura (defendant/appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does adultery, as a ground for divorce in Louisiana, require actual sexual intercourse, and can a defendant's admissions of sexually suggestive acts, when corroborated by other evidence, be considered sufficient proof of adultery?
Opinions:
Majority - Lobrano
No, adultery as grounds for divorce is not limited to actual sexual intercourse, and yes, a defendant's admissions of sexually suggestive acts, when corroborated by other evidence, can be considered sufficient proof of adultery. The court rejected a narrow interpretation of adultery limited to coitus, citing precedents like Menge v. Menge, which held oral sex to be adultery, and cases recognizing homosexual adultery, which by definition does not involve coitus. The court concluded that adultery includes acts beyond traditional sexual intercourse. Regarding the sufficiency of proof, the court acknowledged that an admission of adultery without other evidence is insufficient, as explained in Ogea v. Ogea and Arbour v. Murray, to prevent collusion between spouses for an immediate divorce or to protect against unproven stigma. However, the court found it proper for the trial court to consider Loretta's testimony, as her admissions of sleeping in the same bed, touching sexual organs, and lying on top of each other corroborated the other evidence presented by Rocco (witness testimony and photographs). The court affirmed that these repeated acts of marital infidelity constituted adultery within the meaning of Civil Code Article 139, explicitly limiting its holding to the facts of this case. The court also found no prejudicial error in denying a continuance to obtain testimony about Dakin's sexual impotency, as actual intercourse was not a necessary prerequisite for a finding of adultery.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the legal definition of adultery in Louisiana, moving beyond a strict requirement of penile-vaginal penetration to include other forms of sexual contact and intimacy as grounds for divorce. It also clarifies the evidentiary weight of a defendant's admissions, establishing that while uncorroborated admissions alone are insufficient to prevent collusion, admissions of specific sexually suggestive acts, when supported by independent evidence, can be crucial in proving adultery. This ruling provides a more flexible and realistic approach to proving infidelity in divorce proceedings, potentially making it easier for aggrieved spouses to establish fault without direct proof of coitus and allowing courts to consider a broader range of unfaithful behavior.
