Bonner v. Lynott
2022 NY Slip Op 02175 (2022)
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Rule of Law:
A physician's unauthorized disclosure of their professional medical opinion regarding a patient's condition to a third party constitutes an actionable breach of confidentiality, even if the third party was already aware that a physician-patient relationship existed. A prior administrative finding does not preclude such a claim under collateral estoppel if the plaintiff was unaware of the disclosure during the prior proceeding and thus lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
Facts:
- Kim M. Bonner was a resident in a one-year program at Cornell University's College of Veterinary Medicine.
- After being placed on probation for performance issues, Bonner took a seven-week leave of absence upon the recommendation of her psychiatrist, William Wittlin.
- Following her return, Bonner's supervisor, Elizabeth Buckles, became concerned about Bonner's behavior and had a Cornell psychologist, Gabriel Tornusciolio, contact Wittlin.
- During the phone call, Wittlin told Tornusciolio that he was 'aware of [Bonner's] deterioration' and that she 'was a mess last time [he] saw her.'
- Tornusciolio then relayed the substance of this conversation in an email to Buckles and Cornell's Director of Human Resources.
- Subsequently, a committee of seven faculty members met and voted five to two to deny Bonner reappointment to the residency program for a second year.
Procedural Posture:
- Kim M. Bonner filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) alleging unlawful discrimination by Cornell University, which was dismissed for no probable cause.
- Bonner then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court (trial court) against Cornell, which was also dismissed.
- Bonner subsequently commenced the present action in Supreme Court (trial court) against William Wittlin for breach of physician-patient confidentiality and medical malpractice.
- Wittlin moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint.
- While the motion was pending, Wittlin passed away and Patricia Lynott, as representative of his estate, was substituted as the defendant.
- The Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint in its entirety.
- Bonner, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, against Lynott, as respondent.
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Issue:
Does a psychiatrist's unauthorized disclosure of his professional medical opinion about a patient's deteriorating mental state to the patient's employer constitute an actionable breach of physician-patient confidentiality when the employer was already aware the patient was under the psychiatrist's care?
Opinions:
Majority - McShan, J.
Yes. A psychiatrist's unauthorized disclosure of his professional medical opinion about a patient's condition is an actionable breach of confidentiality. The court found that Wittlin's professional medical opinion that Bonner's mental health was 'deteriorating' was confidential information, distinct from the already-known fact that a physician-patient relationship existed. The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that no confidential information was disclosed. The court also held that the plaintiff could seek damages for emotional harm and that principles of collateral estoppel did not bar the claim. Bonner was unaware of Wittlin's disclosure during her prior administrative proceeding with the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR), meaning she lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate whether the disclosure influenced Cornell's decision. Therefore, the lower court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the breach of confidentiality claim was improper, especially as discovery was incomplete. The court did, however, affirm the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim, finding the issue was a breach of a duty of confidentiality, not a deviation from the standard of care in medical treatment.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the broad scope of the physician-patient privilege, clarifying that a physician's professional opinion about a patient's condition is confidential information, separate from the mere fact of an ongoing treatment relationship. The case also provides a clear application of the limits of collateral estoppel, holding that the doctrine does not apply when a party discovers critical facts only after a prior administrative proceeding has concluded. This emphasizes the 'full and fair opportunity to litigate' requirement and protects plaintiffs who were justifiably ignorant of key evidence. For future cases, this ruling strengthens claims for breach of confidentiality and cautions defendants against seeking premature summary judgment by merely pointing to gaps in a plaintiff's proof without meeting their own affirmative burden.
