Bond v. United States
572 U.S. ____ (2014) (2014)
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Rule of Law:
When a federal statute enacted to implement a treaty criminalizes conduct that falls within the traditional police power of the States, the statute will not be interpreted to reach purely local activity unless Congress has made its intent to do so unmistakably clear.
Facts:
- Carol Anne Bond, a microbiologist, discovered that her husband was the father of her best friend's, Myrlinda Haynes's, child.
- Seeking revenge, Bond stole 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine, an arsenic-based chemical, from her employer, a chemical manufacturer.
- Bond also purchased potassium dichromate, another toxic chemical, through Amazon.com.
- Between November 2006 and June 2007, Bond went to Haynes's home on at least 24 occasions and spread these chemicals on Haynes's car door, mailbox, and doorknob.
- Bond did not intend to kill Haynes but hoped she would develop an uncomfortable rash from touching the chemicals.
- The attempts were largely unsuccessful, but on one occasion Haynes suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb, which she treated by rinsing with water.
- After local police took no action, postal inspectors installed surveillance cameras that captured Bond putting chemicals in Haynes's car muffler and stealing her mail.
Procedural Posture:
- Federal prosecutors charged Carol Anne Bond in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania with mail theft and two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229.
- Bond moved to dismiss the chemical weapon charges, arguing the statute was an unconstitutional infringement on powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment; the trial court denied the motion.
- Bond entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to appeal the trial court's constitutional ruling, and was sentenced to six years in prison.
- On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond, as an individual, lacked standing to raise a Tenth Amendment challenge.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in Bond v. United States (Bond I), reversed the Third Circuit, holding that individuals can raise Tenth Amendment claims.
- On remand, the Third Circuit rejected Bond's statutory and constitutional arguments on the merits and affirmed her conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court again granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision.
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Issue:
Does the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, which criminalizes the possession or use of a "chemical weapon," apply to a purely local assault using common toxic chemicals in a domestic dispute?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act does not cover the unremarkable local offense at issue here. The Court applies the principle of constitutional avoidance, recognizing that Congress does not legislate in derogation of federalism principles without a clear statement. The prosecution of Bond’s purely local crime under this statute would dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction. While the statute’s definition of 'chemical weapon' is incredibly broad, the Court declines to give it a literal reading that would transform a law implementing a chemical warfare treaty into a general federal anti-poisoning statute. The ordinary meaning of 'chemical weapon' does not encompass the chemicals used in the context of Bond's domestic dispute. Reading the statute narrowly avoids both a boundless expansion of federal power and the difficult constitutional question regarding the scope of the Treaty Power.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Scalia
The statutory text is unambiguous and clearly covers Bond's conduct, as she knowingly used a 'toxic chemical' for a purpose that was not 'peaceful.' The majority improperly creates ambiguity to avoid the real constitutional question. The Court's interpretive method makes the statute unconstitutionally vague and usurps the legislative function of defining a crime. The proper course is to address the constitutional issue: the Act is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute the Treaty Power. Congress’s power is to carry into execution the power to make treaties, not to implement the substantive terms of any treaty it makes, as that would grant Congress a general police power and destroy the system of enumerated powers.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Thomas
The statute's text clearly covers Bond's actions. The conviction should be reversed not on statutory grounds, but because the federal government's power is limited. The Treaty Power itself is not boundless and does not extend to regulating purely domestic affairs that lack any nexus to foreign relations. To allow the Treaty Power to regulate any conceivable domestic matter would erase the constitutional distinction between domestic and foreign powers and grant the federal government a general police power, contrary to the original understanding of the Constitution.
Concurring in the judgment - Justice Alito
The statute plainly applies to Bond's conduct. However, the conviction should be reversed on constitutional grounds. The treaty power is limited to matters of legitimate international concern. Insofar as the Chemical Weapons Convention purports to obligate the United States to criminalize purely local conduct, it exceeds the scope of the treaty power. Therefore, the implementing statute, § 229, is not a 'necessary and proper' means of executing the treaty power and is unconstitutional as applied here.
Analysis:
This case is a significant application of the federalism-based 'clear statement rule,' requiring Congress to be explicit when federal law, even law implementing a treaty, intrudes on traditional state authority like criminal law. By using constitutional avoidance, the majority sidestepped a direct reconsideration of Missouri v. Holland, which grants Congress broad power to legislate pursuant to treaties. However, the powerful concurrences from Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito signal a strong judicial interest in imposing substantive, federalism-based limits on the Treaty Power, leaving this fundamental constitutional question unresolved and likely to reappear in future cases.
