Bonbrest v. Kotz
65 F.Supp. 138, 1946 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2712 (1946)
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Rule of Law:
A viable child, born alive, has a right of action in tort for prenatal injuries caused by alleged professional malpractice, recognizing such a child as a distinct legal entity from its mother for purposes of tort law.
Facts:
- An infant was allegedly taken from its mother’s womb by defendants, who were acting in their professional capacities.
- The infant purportedly suffered detrimental consequences as a result of the alleged professional malpractice.
- The infant was viable at the time of the alleged injury, meaning capable of living outside the womb.
- The infant was born alive following the alleged injury and continues to survive.
Procedural Posture:
- An infant, through its father and next friend, initiated a lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against defendants for alleged prenatal injuries resulting from professional malpractice.
- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under common law, an infant has no cause of action for injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere.
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Issue:
Does a viable child, born alive, have a cause of action for injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere due to alleged professional malpractice?
Opinions:
Majority - McGuire, Justice
Yes, a viable child born alive does have a cause of action for injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere due to alleged professional malpractice. The court rejects the traditional common law doctrine, established by Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, which held that a child en ventre sa mere lacked juridical existence and was considered merely a "part" of the mother. Justice McGuire distinguishes Dietrich by emphasizing that the present case involves a direct injury to a viable child who was subsequently born alive, thereby demonstrating its capacity for independent life. The court finds the argument that a viable child is merely a "part" of its mother to be a contradiction in terms, noting that a viable fetus possesses its own distinct bodily form, systems, and individuality. It points out the inconsistency in legal treatment, where a child en ventre sa mere is recognized as a human being in property and criminal law but not in negligence law. Drawing on reasoning from the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, the court asserts that denying a remedy for prenatal injuries would leave a profound wrong uncompensated, compelling the child to endure lifelong infirmities without recourse. The court affirms that the common law is not static and must evolve to reflect advancements in medical science and changing social values, rejecting a "myopic and specious resort to precedent" and "outmoded legal fiction." It concludes that the absence of precedent should not bar a remedy for a clear invasion of an individual’s inherent and sacrosanct rights.
Analysis:
This case represents a landmark shift in American tort law, overturning a long-standing common law doctrine that effectively denied legal personhood to an unborn child. By recognizing a viable fetus, born alive, as a distinct legal entity capable of suing for prenatal injuries, Bonbrest v. Kotz opened the floodgates for similar claims and significantly expanded the scope of tort liability. The decision underscored the judiciary's capacity to adapt common law principles to advancements in medical science and evolving societal understandings of life and rights, rejecting rigid adherence to outdated legal fictions. Its impact was profound, paving the way for the development of modern prenatal injury litigation and influencing the broader legal debate on fetal personhood.
