No, the government cannot do that. The Court said that even though the constitutional rule for the federal government (the Fifth Amendment) doesn't have an 'equal protection' clause like the one for states, it does have a 'due process' clause, which is all about fairness. The Court decided that separating people by race is so unfair that it breaks this rule. It would be 'unthinkable' to say that states can't have segregated schools but the federal government can, right in the nation's capital.

Yes, it is against the Constitution. The ideas of equal protection and fair treatment come from the same place - the American belief in fairness. The Court has said before that treating people differently for no good reason goes against the idea of fair treatment in the Fifth Amendment. Separating people based only on race has to be looked at very carefully because it goes against our traditions and what the Constitution stands for. People should be free to do what they want unless the government has a really good reason to stop them. Separating kids in schools by race is not related to any good reason the government might have, so it takes away the freedom of Negro children in Washington, D.C. and violates the Fifth Amendment's promise of fair treatment. Since the Constitution says states can't have racially segregated schools, it wouldn't make sense for the Constitution to let the federal government do it. So, racial segregation in D.C. public schools goes against the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b572-5"> Mr. Chief Justice Warren </author> delivered the opinion of the Court. This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia. The petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such segregation deprives them of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public school attended by white children solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court for the District of Columbia in obtaining admission. That court dismissed their complaint. The Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional question presented. 344 U. S. 873. We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools. <a class="footnote" href="#fn1" id="fn1_ref"> 1 </a> The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat *499 different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. <a class="footnote" href="#fn2" id="fn2_ref"> 2 </a> Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. <a class="footnote" href="#fn3" id="fn3_ref"> 3 </a> As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle “that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race.” <a class="footnote" href="#fn4" id="fn4_ref"> 4 </a> And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a person of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law. Although the Court has not assumed to define “liberty” with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a *500 proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Eederal Government. <a class="footnote" href="#fn5" id="fn5_ref"> 5 </a> We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. For the reasons set out in Brown v. Board of Education, this case will be restored to the docket for reargument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court. 345 U. S. 972. It is so ordered. <div class="footnotes"><div class="footnote" id="fn1" label="1"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn1_ref"> 1 </a> Brown v. Board of Education, ante, p. 483. </div><div class="footnote" id="fn2" label="2"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn2_ref"> 2 </a> Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 13-14; Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585. </div><div class="footnote" id="fn3" label="3"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn3_ref"> 3 </a> Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 216; Hirabayaski v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100. </div><div class="footnote" id="fn4" label="4"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn4_ref"> 4 </a> Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591. Cf. Steele v. Louisville &amp; Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 198-199. </div><div class="footnote" id="fn5" label="5"> <a class="footnote" href="#fn5_ref"> 5 </a> Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24. </div></div></opinion>

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Although "the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is `so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'"

The concept of due process is broad and expansive, and "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive."

Defendants in the District of Columbia receive equivalent protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Although the Bill of Rights contains no equal protection clause comparable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment grants the same protections from federal government action which the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment gives against state governmental action.

The Court emphasized that it was the fact of discriminatory classification by the government that violated the Constitution, and looked no further for evidence of educational or psychological injury, saying- "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."

Because the District of Columbia is a political entity created by the federal government, it is subject to the Fifth Amendment.

Yes, racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Although the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal government, lacks the explicit Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states, the concepts of equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive. The Court reasoned that discrimination can be so unjustifiable as to violate due process. Classifications based on race are constitutionally suspect and must be scrutinized with particular care. The Court concluded that segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective and therefore imposes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty on the petitioners. It would be 'unthinkable,' the Court stated, that the Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the federal government to avoid segregation than it imposes on the states.

Yes. The concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. As this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Bolling v. Sharpe

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