Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus
196 F.3d 940, 76 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 46,184 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The First Amendment's "ministerial exception" to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not bar a sexual harassment claim brought by a ministerial employee against a religious organization when the organization disavows the alleged conduct and the claim does not interfere with the organization's constitutionally protected prerogative to choose its ministers or to practice its religious beliefs.
Facts:
- In August 1988, John Bollard became a novice of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), beginning his training to become a priest.
- Between 1990 and 1996, Bollard was sexually harassed by his Jesuit superiors at the St. Ignatius College Preparatory School and at the Jesuit School of Theology.
- The harassment included superiors sending him pornographic material, making unwelcome sexual advances, and engaging him in inappropriate sexual discussions.
- Bollard reported the harassment to superiors within the Jesuit order between mid-1995 and 1996, but, to his knowledge, his reports prompted no corrective action.
- The severe harassing conduct forced Bollard to leave the Jesuit order in December 1996 before taking vows to become a priest.
Procedural Posture:
- John Bollard filed a timely complaint of sexual harassment with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, which automatically cross-filed his complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
- Bollard received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC in January 1997.
- In August 1997, Bollard filed a complaint in federal district court for the Northern District of California, asserting a federal cause of action for sexual harassment under Title VII and state law claims (failure to investigate, constructive wrongful discharge, and breach of contract).
- The district court found the ministerial exception applicable, dismissed Bollard’s Title VII claim for want of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment's "ministerial exception" to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bar a sexual harassment claim brought by a ministerial employee against a religious organization when the organization condemns the alleged harassment and the claim does not involve the church's choice of its ministers?
Opinions:
Majority - Fletcher, Circuit Judge
No, the ministerial exception does not bar John Bollard's sexual harassment claim against the Jesuit order. The court reasoned that while the ministerial exception insulates a religious organization's employment decisions regarding its ministers from judicial scrutiny under Title VII, this exception is rooted in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, not the statute itself, and is thus limited to what is constitutionally necessary. The court applied the Free Exercise Clause balancing test (from Sherbert v. Verner), noting that the Jesuits disavowed the alleged harassment, meaning there was no danger of courts passing judgment on religious faith or doctrine, and no significant impact on their religious beliefs. The claim was not about the Jesuits' choice of representative (e.g., ordination or termination), but rather their alleged failure to stop harassment. The compelling state interest in preventing sexual harassment, which Congress intended Title VII to address, outweighed the general concern for church autonomy where no doctrinal or protected-choice rationale was presented by the church. Under the Establishment Clause, applying the Lemon test, the court focused on whether there would be excessive government entanglement. It found no substantive entanglement because the case did not involve the church's freedom to choose its ministers or its religious mission. Procedural entanglement was deemed minimal because the inquiry would be restricted to secular judgments about the harassment and the church's actions, not religious doctrine. Furthermore, Bollard sought only damages, not reinstatement or other equitable relief that would require ongoing court surveillance. Therefore, the court concluded that the limited and retrospective nature of the damages remedy meant the procedural entanglement was not significant enough to violate the Establishment Clause.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the boundaries of the ministerial exception, demonstrating that it is not a blanket immunity from all secular employment laws for religious organizations. By distinguishing between claims that implicate a church's core religious functions (like choosing clergy) and those that concern universally condemned conduct disavowed by the church itself, the court restricts the exception's application. The ruling implies that religious institutions are subject to secular laws, such as Title VII's prohibition on sexual harassment, especially when the alleged conduct is not justified by religious doctrine and the remedy sought does not interfere with ecclesiastical matters. This precedent serves to protect ministerial employees from severe misconduct while upholding the constitutional protections for religious autonomy in matters of faith and leadership.
