Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.
926 F. Supp. 211 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
The Price-Anderson Act creates an exclusive federal cause of action, known as a 'public liability action,' for injuries arising from a nuclear incident. While this federal action incorporates substantive state law, any state law theory that is inconsistent with the federal regulatory scheme, such as a state-based standard of care for negligence or strict liability, is preempted.
Facts:
- Approximately two weeks before October 11, 1994, a radioactive gas leak occurred at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's nuclear facility.
- On October 11, 1994, Maine Yankee invited five University of Southern Maine students for a tour of the facility.
- During the tour, Maine Yankee conducted a procedure to flush radioactive resin 'hot spots,' which officials knew would release radioactive gases into the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB).
- A tour guide led the students through a plume of unfiltered radioactive gases in the PAB while a continuous air monitor alarm was sounding.
- After the tour, portal monitors that the students passed through 'alarmed out,' indicating they had been exposed to excessive radioactive contamination.
- Maine Yankee employees allegedly told the students they had not been exposed to anything that would pose a health risk and were not advised to decontaminate themselves.
- Plaintiff Bohrmann subsequently suffered a significant decrease in his white blood cell count, and all plaintiffs experienced significant emotional distress.
- Defendant allegedly destroyed charts showing the level of radioactive gases in the PAB shortly after the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiffs, several University of Southern Maine students, filed a complaint against Defendant, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine.
- The complaint asserted claims under state common law (negligence, infliction of emotional distress, strict liability, fraud, battery, failure to report) and a federal public liability claim under the Atomic Energy Act.
- Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the federal Price-Anderson Act provides the exclusive cause of action and preempts the Plaintiffs' state law claims.
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Issue:
Does the Price-Anderson Act preempt state law tort claims for injuries arising from a nuclear incident, thereby establishing federal regulations as the exclusive standard of care for such claims?
Opinions:
Majority - Carter, Chief Judge
Yes, the Price-Anderson Act preempts independent state law tort claims for nuclear incidents by creating a single, exclusive federal 'public liability action,' and for negligence-based theories within that action, federal regulations provide the exclusive standard of care. The court reasoned that Congress, through the 1988 Amendments Act, transformed the legal landscape by supplanting all possible state causes of action with this federal one. While the Act directs courts to use state law for the 'substantive rules for decision,' this does not apply where state law is inconsistent with the federal scheme. The court found that federal law has pervasively occupied the field of nuclear safety. Therefore, state law claims for strict liability and failure to meet state reporting requirements are preempted as inconsistent. Similarly, the standard of care for negligence is defined exclusively by federal occupational dose limits (10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1201-20.1208), not the more aspirational ALARA standard or state common law. However, state law claims for intentional torts (battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress) and fraud are not preempted, as they concern a defendant's intentional conduct, which is not governed by the federal safety standards for negligence.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the complex jurisdictional and substantive framework of the Price-Anderson Act after its 1988 amendments. It establishes that while plaintiffs are channeled into a single federal cause of action, they can still utilize state law theories of liability, but only to the extent they do not conflict with federal law. The case is significant for drawing a clear line: the standard of care for negligence is exclusively federal, preempting state common law, while claims based on intentional conduct can proceed under state law principles. This creates a hybrid system that preserves a role for state tort law in intentional harms while ensuring a uniform, federally-defined safety standard for accidental radiation exposure.
