Boblitt v. Boblitt
190 Cal. App. 4th 603, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 2010 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
Under California's primary rights theory, a request for spousal support in a marital dissolution proceeding does not bar a subsequent tort action for domestic violence because the two actions vindicate different primary rights. Furthermore, a judgment is not considered final for the purposes of claim or issue preclusion while it is pending on appeal.
Facts:
- Linda Boblitt and Steven Boblitt began cohabiting in February 1983, at which time Steven's verbal abuse of Linda began.
- The abuse escalated to physical violence, and in December 1984, Steven broke Linda's jaw.
- The couple married in December 1989.
- Steven's physical and verbal abuse of Linda continued periodically over the next 23 years.
- Linda filed for dissolution of the marriage in January 2004.
- After the dissolution filing, Steven continued to verbally harass and physically abuse Linda through at least January 2008.
Procedural Posture:
- Linda Boblitt filed a petition for dissolution of marriage against Steven Boblitt in family court.
- In the dissolution proceeding, Linda raised the issue of Steven's domestic violence as a factor for the family court to consider in awarding spousal support.
- While the dissolution was pending, Linda filed a separate civil complaint against Steven in superior court, seeking tort damages for domestic violence, assault, and battery.
- The family court entered a judgment on reserved issues in the dissolution proceeding, which addressed spousal support after considering the domestic violence allegations.
- Linda, as appellant, appealed the family court's judgment in the dissolution proceeding.
- While that appeal was pending, Steven filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the tort action, arguing it was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
- The trial court granted Steven's motion and entered a judgment of dismissal against Linda.
- Linda, as appellant, appealed the dismissal of her tort action to the Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a family court's consideration of domestic violence evidence when determining spousal support in a marital dissolution proceeding preclude a subsequent, separate tort action for damages based on the same domestic violence under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel?
Opinions:
Majority - Robie, Acting P. J.
No. A family court's consideration of domestic violence for spousal support does not preclude a subsequent tort action for damages based on the same acts. The court provided two independent reasons for its holding. First, the judgment in the dissolution proceeding was on appeal at the time the trial court ruled, and a judgment is not final for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel until the appeal is resolved. Second, and more substantively, the court held that the two proceedings do not involve the same 'primary right.' The primary right in a dissolution proceeding is the right to obtain spousal support, where domestic violence is one of many factors considered. In contrast, the primary right in the tort action is the right to be free from personal injury. Because the primary rights and corresponding duties are distinct, the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) does not apply. The court also noted that family courts lack jurisdiction to award tort damages, so the family court judge's refusal to award Linda compensation for medical bills and pain and suffering could not have a preclusive effect.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between family law jurisdiction and general civil tort litigation in California. It firmly establishes that victims of domestic violence are not forced to choose between raising the issue in a dissolution proceeding for support purposes and seeking full compensation in a separate tort action. By applying the primary rights theory, the court preserves the ability of a party to pursue remedies in different legal forums when the fundamental rights being vindicated are distinct, even if the underlying facts overlap. This prevents the limited scope and remedies of family court from extinguishing a valid personal injury claim, ensuring victims have a path to be made whole for their injuries.
