Board of Supervisors of Cerro Gordo County v. Miller
170 N.W.2d 358, 1969 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 889 (1969)
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Rule of Law:
A zoning ordinance requiring the termination of a lawful, pre-existing nonconforming use after a reasonable amortization period is a constitutional exercise of the police power and does not constitute a taking of property without due process, provided the public gain outweighs the private loss.
Facts:
- Defendants, the Chazens, owned and operated an automobile wrecking business known as Chazen's Auto Parts.
- The business was a lawful enterprise in operation before the enactment of any relevant zoning ordinance.
- On June 4, 1962, Cerro Gordo County enacted a zoning ordinance that classified the land on which the business operated as an 'A-Agricultural District'.
- The ordinance designated automobile wrecking yards as a nonconforming use within that agricultural district.
- A provision in the ordinance mandated that all pre-existing, nonconforming automobile wrecking yards must be discontinued within five years of the ordinance's effective date.
- The Chazens' business operation was described as substantial, but no evidence was presented regarding their investment in buildings or improvements on the land.
- The Chazens intentionally continued to operate their business for more than five years after the ordinance took effect.
Procedural Posture:
- The Board of Supervisors of Cerro Gordo County sued the Chazens in an equity action in the state trial court.
- The Board of Supervisors sought an injunction to compel the Chazens to cease operating their automobile wrecking business.
- The trial court found in favor of the Board of Supervisors and granted the injunction.
- The Chazens, as appellants, appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Iowa.
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Issue:
Does a county zoning ordinance that requires the termination of a pre-existing, lawful, nonconforming use (an automobile wrecking yard) within a five-year amortization period violate the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal constitutions?
Opinions:
Majority - Rawlings, Justice
No. A county zoning ordinance requiring the termination of a pre-existing nonconforming use within a reasonable amortization period does not violate constitutional due process protections. Zoning ordinances are a valid exercise of police power and are presumed to be constitutional; the burden is on the challenger to prove the ordinance is unreasonable. The court found that amortization is an effective and equitable method for eliminating nonconforming uses, which are inconsistent with the ultimate purpose of zoning. The reasonableness of the amortization period is determined by balancing the public good against the private loss. In this case, the defendants failed to carry their burden of proof, as they presented no evidence of their financial investment, the value of improvements, or the specific hardship they would suffer from compliance. Because the reasonableness of the five-year period was 'fairly debatable,' the ordinance must be upheld.
Dissenting - Stuart, Justice
Yes. The ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process of law and just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. The dissent argues there is a fundamental difference in kind, not merely degree, between restricting future property uses and terminating existing, vested property rights. Forcing a lawful, existing business to close results in a direct financial loss that amounts to a taking. The concept of 'amortization' is a 'catch phrase' used to justify confiscation without compensation; a fixed five-year period for a junkyard is arbitrary and not tied to the property's actual useful economic life. If the public benefit of removing the junkyard is so great, the public should pay for it through eminent domain rather than forcing an individual property owner to bear the entire cost.
Analysis:
This case aligns Iowa with the growing judicial trend of upholding amortization as a constitutional method for eliminating nonconforming uses under zoning regulations. The decision shifts the legal landscape by treating such termination not as a 'taking' requiring compensation, but as a reasonable exercise of police power. It establishes a significant precedent by placing a heavy evidentiary burden on property owners to prove an amortization period is unreasonable as applied to them, requiring specific proof of investment and economic hardship. The 4-4 split affirming the lower court means the opinion itself does not carry statewide binding precedential weight, but it provides a strong indication of the court's direction on this issue and a framework for future legal challenges.
