Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York et al. v. Tomanio
446 U.S. 478 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
When a federal court borrows a state's statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, it must also borrow the state's corresponding tolling rules unless those rules are inconsistent with federal law.
Facts:
- Mary Tomanio had been practicing chiropractic medicine in New York since 1958.
- In 1963, New York enacted a statute requiring chiropractors to be licensed.
- The statute provided several methods for licensure, including a special examination for current practitioners.
- Between 1964 and 1971, Tomanio took and failed the special licensing examination seven times, sometimes by a narrow margin.
- Following her examination failures, Tomanio applied to the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York for a waiver of the examination requirement, as permitted by state law.
- Tomanio's waiver application cited her narrow exam failures, her licenses in Maine and New Hampshire, and her passing of a national board exam.
- On November 22, 1971, the Board of Regents notified Tomanio that it had voted to deny her waiver application.
- The Board did not provide Tomanio with an evidentiary hearing or a statement of reasons for the denial.
Procedural Posture:
- In January 1972, Mary Tomanio sued the Board of Regents in a New York state trial court, alleging the waiver denial was arbitrary and capricious under state law.
- The state trial court granted relief to Tomanio.
- The Board of Regents, as appellant, appealed to the state's intermediate appellate court, the Appellate Division, which reversed the trial court's order.
- Tomanio, as appellant, appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, which affirmed the Appellate Division's decision in November 1975.
- On June 25, 1976, Tomanio sued the Board of Regents in the U.S. District Court, alleging a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- The District Court rejected the Board's statute of limitations defense, holding that the limitations period was tolled during the state court proceedings, and found in favor of Tomanio on the merits.
- The Board of Regents, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, agreeing that tolling was appropriate.
- The Board of Regents petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a state's rule that a statute of limitations is not tolled during the pursuit of a related but independent state court action become 'inconsistent' with federal law when applied to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, thereby requiring a federal court to create its own tolling rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No, a state's rule that its statute of limitations is not tolled during the pursuit of a related, independent state-court action is not inconsistent with federal law when applied to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. When federal law provides no statute of limitations, courts must borrow not only the analogous state statute of limitations but also its coordinate tolling rules. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, state law governs unless it is inconsistent with federal law. New York law does not toll the limitations period while a litigant pursues a separate, independent cause of action. This rule is not inconsistent with the policies of § 1983, such as deterrence and compensation, because plaintiffs can still bring their claims within the statutory period. As established in Monroe v. Pape, the § 1983 remedy is supplementary and independent, not requiring exhaustion of state remedies. Therefore, a state tolling rule that does not encourage prior resort to state courts does not conflict with Congress's intent in creating an independent federal remedy. Adopting a federal tolling rule would improperly reject the state legislature's chosen policy of repose and would not be a 'triumph of federalism.'
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes, under these facts, applying the New York tolling rules is inconsistent with federal law and the Constitution. The majority's reliance on legislative silence to infer a strong state policy against tolling is speculative. More importantly, federal law should accommodate and encourage plaintiffs who first resort to state courts to resolve state-law issues, as this can reduce the burden on federal courts and respect federalism. Penalizing a plaintiff by time-barring their federal claim for having first sought relief in state court is inconsistent with the goals of § 1983. A procedure similar to the reservation of federal claims established in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners would be more appropriate, allowing plaintiffs to litigate state claims in state court without forfeiting their right to a federal forum for their federal claims. As Tomanio could not have anticipated this ruling, it should not be applied to her.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
No, Tomanio's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, but the judgment should be reversed on the merits. Tomanio's federal action was timely because it was filed only seven months after the New York state proceedings concluded; the federal claim did not fully 'crystalize' until then. It is counterproductive to penalize a litigant for first seeking a remedy in state court. However, Tomanio's underlying due process claim lacks merit. The state's licensing procedure, including the discretionary waiver provision, is not fundamentally unfair. Tomanio had an adequate opportunity to present her reasons for a waiver and ultimately received an explanation for the denial. Therefore, while the majority's statute of limitations reasoning is incorrect, its result of reversing the Court of Appeals is correct because Tomanio's constitutional challenge fails.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that federal courts borrowing a state statute of limitations for a federal claim must import the entire state limitations scheme, including its tolling provisions. The Court rejected the creation of a federal common law of tolling for § 1983 cases based on federalism interests, holding that true federalism requires respecting the state's own legislative choices regarding repose. This ruling significantly impacts litigation strategy, discouraging plaintiffs from exhausting state judicial remedies for state-law claims before filing a federal § 1983 action. It effectively encourages the filing of concurrent state and federal lawsuits or joining state claims in a federal action to avoid the risk of a time bar.
