Blueford v. Arkansas
2012 U.S. LEXIS 3941, 182 L. Ed. 2d 937, 566 U.S. 599 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the retrial of a defendant on charges for which a jury foreperson announced a unanimous vote against conviction, if the jury continued to deliberate after the announcement, failed to reach a final verdict on any charge, and the court properly declared a mistrial.
Facts:
- Alex Blueford was at home with his mother's boyfriend, one-year-old Matthew McFadden, Jr.
- While in Blueford's care, McFadden suffered a severe head injury.
- A few days after sustaining the injury, McFadden died.
- Blueford's explanation for the injury was that he accidentally knocked McFadden onto the ground.
- The State's theory was that Blueford had intentionally injured McFadden under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Arkansas charged Alex Blueford with capital murder in state trial court.
- The trial court instructed the jury on capital murder and the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide, requiring them to consider the offenses sequentially.
- During deliberations, the jury foreperson reported that the jury was unanimous against guilt on capital and first-degree murder but was deadlocked on manslaughter.
- Blueford’s counsel requested that the court provide partial verdict forms for the charges the jury had agreed upon, but the court denied the request.
- The jury continued to deliberate but remained unable to reach a verdict, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial.
- The State sought to retry Blueford on all charges, including capital and first-degree murder.
- Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial court denied.
- On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas (the state's highest court) affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial for greater offenses when a jury foreperson reports in open court that the jury was unanimous against conviction on those offenses, but the jury then deadlocks on a lesser-included offense and the court declares a mistrial without a formal verdict being entered?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial in these circumstances. The jury foreperson's mid-deliberation report of the jury's votes lacked the finality required to constitute an acquittal. The fact that deliberations continued after the report means the jury was free to reconsider its preliminary votes on the greater offenses. Because no final verdict was rendered on any count before the mistrial was declared, the 'jeopardy' of the first trial never terminated, and the State is not barred from retrying Blueford on all charges. The declaration of a mistrial due to a genuinely deadlocked jury is a 'classic basis' of manifest necessity, and the trial judge was not constitutionally required to offer partial verdict forms or explore other alternatives.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
Yes, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial on the greater offenses. An acquittal is a matter of substance, not form, and the foreperson's announcement in open court that the jury was 'unanimous against' conviction on the murder charges was a substantive acquittal. Under Arkansas's 'acquittal-first' jury instructions, the jury could only consider the lesser offense of manslaughter after unanimously acquitting Blueford of the greater murder charges. The announcement thus represented a final decision on those counts which is protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even if it were not a final acquittal, there was no 'manifest necessity' for a mistrial on the murder charges, as the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to accept a partial verdict or even inquire if the jury's announced decision on those charges was final.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high premium the Supreme Court places on the finality of a jury verdict for double jeopardy purposes. It clarifies that informal, mid-deliberation statements by a jury, even if they report unanimity, do not constitute an 'acquittal' if the jury has the opportunity to reconsider. The ruling grants prosecutors the ability to retry defendants on all charges following a hung jury on a lesser-included offense, potentially limiting the perceived benefit of 'acquittal-first' jury instructions for defendants. It also affirms broad discretion for trial judges in managing hung juries, declining to impose a constitutional requirement to seek partial verdicts before declaring a mistrial.
