Bloomfield v. City of St. Petersburg Beach
82 So.2d 364 (1955)
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Rule of Law:
Legal residence is established by the concurrence of a bona fide intention to make a place a permanent home and an actual removal to that place evidenced by overt acts. A subsequent temporary absence for a specific, limited purpose with a clear intention to return does not destroy a residence that has already been established.
Facts:
- Carlisle T. Manly and his wife purchased real estate in St. Petersburg Beach in 1950 and, in early 1952, began building a motel with a personal apartment, intending to make it their permanent home.
- In August 1952, the motel was completed, Mrs. Manly moved into their apartment with their personal belongings, and in September 1952, they sold their Michigan home and moved their bank accounts to Florida.
- Both Mr. and Mrs. Manly testified that they formed the definitive intent to become permanent Florida residents on December 1, 1952.
- Shortly after December 1, 1952, Mr. Manly returned to Michigan for a pre-planned period of one year for the sole purpose of working to supplement their income and enhance his retirement benefits, while his wife remained in their Florida home.
- In December 1953, Manly permanently returned to Florida as planned, registered to vote in January 1954, and subsequently ran for City Commissioner.
- In the election on May 4, 1954, Manly received enough votes to win a seat on the City Commission, and the incumbent commission certified the results.
- At the first meeting after the election, a rival political faction on the commission (the "Bloomfield group") declared Manly ineligible, asserting he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement for being a qualified elector.
- This declaration resulted in two competing groups claiming to be the legitimate city government, appointing duplicate officials and creating widespread confusion and paralysis in municipal operations.
Procedural Posture:
- Compton, Manly, and Neel (the "Manly group") initiated a declaratory judgment proceeding in the Circuit Court against the "Bloomfield group."
- The Circuit Court, acting as the trial court, heard testimony and entered a decree finding that Manly was a qualified elector and eligible to hold office.
- The "Bloomfield group," as defendants below, appealed the adverse decree to the Supreme Court of Florida.
- In the appeal, the Bloomfield group are the appellants, and the City of St. Petersburg Beach and the Manly group are the appellees.
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Issue:
Is a person a qualified elector of a municipality, having met the one-year residency requirement, if they established a home and demonstrated a bona fide intent to remain permanently, but were temporarily absent from the state for work during part of that year?
Opinions:
Majority - Thornal, Justice
Yes. A person meets the residency requirement for being a qualified elector when a good faith intention to make a place their permanent home concurs with actual removal to that location, even if they are temporarily absent for a specific purpose like work. The court found that legal residence consists of the concurrence of both fact (actual removal) and intention (a bona fide intent to remain). Manly demonstrated this concurrence as of December 1, 1952, through overt acts like selling his Michigan home, moving his finances and family to Florida, and filing federal tax returns as a Florida resident. His subsequent one-year absence was for a specific, temporary purpose with a clear intent to return to his established Florida residence, which does not negate the residency already established.
Concurring - Drew, Chief Justice
Yes. The finding that Manly was a qualified elector is correct, and the use of a declaratory judgment action was appropriate in this case. Although quo warranto is the traditional remedy for trying title to an office, the severe municipal chaos and confusion justified the use of a declaratory judgment action to achieve an expeditious resolution. The Declaratory Judgment Act is intended to be broad and flexible, and the statute explicitly states that the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a court's jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief.
Dissenting - Thomas, Justice
No. The issue should not have been decided because the case should have been brought as a quo warranto proceeding. The dissent argues that because the litigation's core purpose was to determine the title to a public office, the proper and exclusive remedy was quo warranto, not a declaratory judgment action.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the legal standard for domicile, emphasizing that a person's bona fide intent, supported by overt actions, is paramount in establishing residency. It establishes that a temporary absence for a specific purpose does not defeat a previously established domicile, providing a key precedent for cases involving residency for voting, taxation, and holding office. Furthermore, the court's approval of using a declaratory judgment action, despite the availability of quo warranto, underscores the judiciary's willingness to employ flexible remedies to resolve situations of public urgency and governmental chaos, reinforcing the broad, remedial purpose of such statutes.
