Bloch v. Frischholz
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 14576, 2008 WL 2685668, 533 F.3d 562 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
The Fair Housing Act's prohibition on religious discrimination does not require a private housing association to provide an accommodation or exception for religious practices from a neutral, generally applicable rule that was not adopted with discriminatory intent.
Facts:
- In September 2001, the Shoreline Towers Condominium Association adopted rules prohibiting owners from placing 'objects of any sort' or signs outside their unit doors.
- Lynne Bloch, a Jewish resident and board member, chaired the committee that drafted these rules.
- For several years, the association did not enforce the rule against mezuzot, religious items that observant Jews like the Blochs display on their doorposts.
- In 2004, after the hallways were repainted, the association began to strictly enforce the rule against all objects.
- The association removed the Blochs' mezuzah from their doorpost.
- When the Blochs re-affixed the mezuzah, the association removed it again, citing the hallway rule.
- The association enforced the rule broadly, also removing secular items like photos and posters, as well as other religious items like crucifixes and Christmas ornaments.
Procedural Posture:
- Lynne Bloch and her family sued the Shoreline Towers Condominium Association and its president in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3617.
- The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.
- The Blochs, as appellants, appealed the summary judgment ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a condominium association's neutral, generally applicable rule prohibiting all objects, including religious symbols, from being placed in common hallways violate the Fair Housing Act's prohibition on religious discrimination when the rule is not motivated by discriminatory intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Easterbrook, Chief Judge
No. A neutral, generally applicable rule that does not refer to religion and is not motivated by discriminatory animus does not violate the Fair Housing Act simply because it lacks a religious exception. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) prohibits discrimination, but it does not mandate religious accommodation. The statute's structure demonstrates this distinction, as it explicitly requires accommodation for handicaps but not for religion, race, or sex. The rule in question was neutral on its face and in its application, affecting all residents and banning all objects, both secular and religious. There was no evidence of discriminatory intent; in fact, plaintiff Lynne Bloch helped draft the rule. While state and local governments are free to legislate religious accommodation requirements, federal courts cannot read such a requirement into the FHA where Congress did not place one.
Dissenting - Wood, Circuit Judge
Yes. A reasonable jury could find that the association's sudden reinterpretation and enforcement of the rule constituted intentional religious discrimination, not merely a failure to accommodate. The central issue is not the rule's adoption in 2001, but its transformation in 2004 from a general clutter rule into one targeting a practice central to the Blochs' Jewish faith. This targeted enforcement, especially the cruel act of removing the mezuzah during the family's shiva mourning period, provides strong evidence of discriminatory animus. This enforcement effectively makes the dwelling unavailable to observant Jews, which constitutes a constructive eviction in violation of § 3604(a) and discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, or privileges' of ownership under § 3604(b).
Analysis:
This decision reinforces a critical distinction within Fair Housing Act jurisprudence between outright discrimination and a mere failure to accommodate religion. It clarifies that, unlike the FHA's explicit mandate to provide reasonable accommodations for disabilities, there is no corresponding federal requirement for private housing providers to create exceptions for religious practices from their neutral, generally applicable rules. The ruling effectively shifts the responsibility for creating religious accommodation rights in housing to state and local legislatures, as exemplified by the subsequent actions of Chicago and Illinois. This precedent narrows the scope of post-acquisition FHA claims, requiring plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination rather than just an incidental burden on their religious observance.
