Bliven v. Hunt
579 F.3d 204, 2009 WL 2700173, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19341 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
A judge's act of determining the reasonableness of a court-appointed attorney's fee request for a specific case is a judicial function, not an administrative one. Therefore, judges and their staff performing this function are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suits for damages.
Facts:
- From 2000 to 2005, David Bliven was an attorney on New York City's Assigned Counsel Panel, serving as a public defender in Family Court.
- Bliven represented clients in cases assigned to him by family court judges, including Judges John Hunt, Barbara Salinitro, and Guy DePhillips.
- In 2001, Bliven made motions in approximately 15 cases to compel the disclosure of case records from the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS).
- Beginning in March 2002, Bliven alleges that Judges Hunt and Salinitro, along with their staff, began reducing the compensation he requested on his payment vouchers for work on ACS-related cases.
- Bliven claims the judges' staff attorneys told him the reductions were a result of his motions to compel disclosure from ACS.
- Bliven alleges he was underpaid by a total of $16,637.39 due to these reductions.
- Bliven also claims that his complaints about the voucher reductions led to threats of a grievance being filed against him, which he asserts forced him to withdraw from the public defender panel.
Procedural Posture:
- David Bliven filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against several state judges, their staff attorneys, and the City of New York.
- The district court, acting sua sponte, dismissed the claims against the individual defendants (the judges and staff), holding they were protected by absolute judicial immunity.
- The district court denied Bliven's subsequent motion to amend his complaint to allege the defendants were acting in an administrative capacity, finding the amendment would be futile.
- The district court then granted the City of New York's motion to dismiss the federal claims against it, ruling that the judges were state employees and not municipal policymakers.
- Having dismissed all federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Bliven's state-law breach of contract claim.
- Bliven (appellant) appealed the district court's dismissals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a judge's act of determining and approving compensation for a court-appointed attorney in a specific case constitute a 'judicial act' for which the judge is entitled to absolute immunity, rather than an 'administrative act'?
Opinions:
Majority - Kearse, Circuit Judge
Yes, a judge's act of determining and approving compensation for a court-appointed attorney in a specific case is a judicial act for which the judge is entitled to absolute immunity. The court applied a functional approach, which looks at the nature of the act itself and the expectations of the parties. The court reasoned that determining reasonable attorney's fees is a quintessential judicial function, analogous to fee-shifting decisions under numerous federal statutes, because it is inherently tied to a specific case over which the judge presided. This differs from non-judicial administrative acts, such as hiring and firing court employees or compiling general lists of eligible attorneys, which are not related to a specific case. The court distinguished this case from Mitchell v. Fishbein, where compiling a panel of eligible attorneys was deemed administrative because it did not relate to any particular case. Because the fee determination is case-specific and requires the judge's unique familiarity with the litigation, it is a judicial act protected by absolute immunity.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the broad scope of judicial immunity by classifying case-specific attorney fee determinations as a core judicial function rather than an unprotected administrative one. It clarifies the line between protected judicial acts (those tied to a specific case) and administrative ones, making it significantly harder for attorneys to sue judges over compensation disputes arising from court-appointed work. The ruling emphasizes that federal courts will use a functional analysis for immunity purposes, regardless of how a state may characterize the act for its own procedural reasons. This precedent reinforces the high bar for overcoming judicial immunity and protects judges from liability for actions central to their case-management authority.
