No. The rule that the state must be in 'substantial compliance' is a report card for the federal government to check on the state's overall performance; it's not a personal promise to every single parent. A state program can get a passing grade overall even if it fails some individual families. You can't sue to fix the whole system at once. Instead, you have to point to a very specific part of the law that gives you a personal right (like a rule that says 'the state must give you this specific money it collected') and show that the state broke that specific rule for you.

I agree with the result, but I have a bigger question. These government funding programs are like contracts: the feds give money, and the state promises to help people. The people being helped aren't part of the contract. Back when the law allowing these lawsuits was written, you usually couldn't sue over a contract you weren't part of. I'm not sure people should be able to sue over these government deals at all, but since the court is deciding this case on other grounds, I'll join them.

No, this specific part of the child support law about 'substantial compliance' wasn't meant to give individual parents a right to sue. It's more about telling states how to run the whole program and when they might lose money for not doing a good job. There might be other parts of the law that do give parents specific rights. The lower court needs to look at this again.

I agree this law doesn't let these parents sue the state. But I'm not sure if people can ever use Section 1983 to sue when the state promises the federal government it will do something in exchange for money. In the past, people who benefited from a contract couldn't sue over it. The Court's opinion doesn't decide that bigger question.

Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff; 2) plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and 3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the states.

USC § 1983.[7] To seek redress through § 1983, a plaintiff "must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely the violation of a federal law."

"Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an individual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983."

"Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person `of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'[T] his provision safeguards certain rights conferred by federal statutes. "

In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.

The US Supreme Court "traditionally look [s] at three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right."

—the Supreme court identified three factors as instructive in determining whether or not a statute confers a right enforceable by a plaintiff under § 1983: First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff.

—that a State operate its child support program in `substantial compliance'with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right. Far from creating an individual entitlement to services, the standard is simply a yardstick for the Secretary to measure the systemwide performance of a state's Title …

First, defendants assert that plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1983, because there is no private right of action under the Social Security Act

No. Title IV-D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply with the statute. The requirement that a state operate its child support program in 'substantial compliance' was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but is instead a yardstick for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to measure the system-wide performance of a state’s program. A state can be in substantial compliance even while failing to meet the needs of a significant percentage of individuals, demonstrating that the standard does not create an individual entitlement. Plaintiffs must identify specific, concrete, individual rights within a statute to state a claim under § 1983, rather than asserting a generalized right to have the entire program function properly. While some specific provisions of Title IV-D might create individual rights, a blanket claim for 'substantial compliance' across all programmatic operations is not a cognizable federal right.

Yes, I agree with the Court's conclusion under the existing test. However, a more fundamental question exists as to whether third-party beneficiaries of federal-state spending agreements should be able to sue under § 1983 at all. These agreements are like contracts where the state promises the federal government it will provide services to individuals. At the time § 1983 was enacted, third-party beneficiaries generally could not sue to enforce a contract. This historical understanding raises the possibility that such suits are not authorized by § 1983, but since the Court's opinion correctly resolves the case under current precedent and leaves this question open, I join the opinion.

No. The requirement that a State operate its child support program in 'substantial compliance' with Title IV-D was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, and therefore it does not constitute a federal right. The substantial compliance standard is designed only to guide the State in structuring its systemwide efforts and to trigger penalty provisions that reduce the State's AFDC grant. Some provisions of Title IV-D may give rise to individual rights, but the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Title IV-D creates a broad enforceable right to substantial compliance. The case is remanded for the District Court to determine whether any specific claim asserts an individual federal right.

I agree that under the Wright and Wilder tests, Title IV-D does not permit individuals to sue under § 1983 to challenge a State's failure to achieve substantial compliance. However, I question whether § 1983 ever authorizes beneficiaries of a federal-state funding agreement to bring suit, since historically third-party beneficiaries could not enforce a contract. The Court's opinion leaves open the possibility that such suits may not lie.

Blessing v. Freestone

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