Blazel v. Bradley
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12535, 698 F.Supp. 756, 1988 WL 118395 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute permitting ex parte temporary restraining orders that deprive an individual of property or liberty interests satisfies the Due Process Clause only if it is construed to require a showing of imminent harm, in addition to providing for judicial review, a prompt post-deprivation hearing, and a verified petition with specific allegations.
Facts:
- Alvin Blazel and Donna Blazel were married and jointly owned their residence.
- On March 13, 1987, Donna Blazel filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO), requesting that Alvin be removed from their home.
- The petition alleged two past incidents of physical abuse: one on February 28, 1987 (about two weeks prior) and another around February 12, 1987 (about a month prior).
- The petition did not contain any allegation that Donna Blazel was in fear of imminent or immediate harm from Alvin Blazel.
- Based solely on the petition and without any notice to Alvin Blazel, Judge Ann Walsh Bradley issued an ex parte TRO ordering him to leave his home and avoid contact with his wife.
- Alvin Blazel was served with the order the next day and was forced to leave his home.
- After the first action was dismissed, Donna Blazel filed a second petition on March 19, 1987, repeating the previous allegations and adding others about earlier incidents, again without alleging imminent danger.
- A different judge issued a second ex parte TRO based on this second petition, again ordering Alvin Blazel to leave his home.
Procedural Posture:
- Alvin Blazel filed a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge Ann Walsh Bradley in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, a federal trial court.
- Blazel sought a declaration that Wisconsin Statute § 813.12(3)(b) was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.
- Both Blazel (plaintiff) and Judge Bradley (defendant) filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to rule in their favor based on the undisputed facts.
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Issue:
Does a state statute authorizing ex parte temporary restraining orders in domestic abuse cases violate the Due Process Clause if it does not explicitly require an allegation of imminent harm before depriving a person of their property and liberty interests?
Opinions:
Majority - Crabb, C.J.
No. The statute does not violate the Due Process Clause on its face because it can be reasonably construed to require a showing of imminent harm, a constitutional prerequisite for issuing an ex parte order that deprives an individual of property or liberty interests. The court reasoned that an ex parte TRO removing a person from their home implicates significant property and liberty interests, triggering due process protections. While a pre-deprivation hearing is not always required in emergencies, certain procedural safeguards must be in place. Drawing from Supreme Court precedent, the court identified four necessary safeguards: (1) review by a judicial officer, (2) a verified petition with specific facts, (3) a prompt post-deprivation hearing, and (4) a showing of imminent and irreparable harm. The Wisconsin statute explicitly provides the first three safeguards but is silent on the fourth. Rather than declare the statute unconstitutional, the court applied the canon of constitutional avoidance. By examining the statute's legislative history, the court concluded the legislature intended to require a showing of imminent harm to avoid the constitutional problems of a prior statute. Therefore, the court read this requirement into the statute, rendering it facially constitutional. However, because Donna Blazel's petition lacked any allegation of imminent harm, the statute was applied unconstitutionally to Alvin Blazel.
Analysis:
This decision exemplifies the principle of constitutional avoidance, where a court interprets a statute to preserve its constitutionality if such a reading is plausible. By imputing an 'imminent harm' requirement into the statute, the court balanced the state's compelling interest in protecting domestic abuse victims against the due process rights of the accused. This ruling clarifies for lower courts that even with a facially valid statute, the specific facts of a petition must support a finding of immediacy to justify an ex parte deprivation. It establishes a crucial check on the power to remove someone from their home without a prior hearing, ensuring the emergency procedure is reserved for true emergencies.
