Blanton v. Womancare, Inc.
696 P.2d 645, 38 Cal. 3d 396, 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An attorney, merely by virtue of their employment, does not have the apparent authority to bind a client to an agreement for binding arbitration that waives the client's substantial rights, including the right to a trial, without the client's express consent.
Facts:
- On February 17, 1977, Harriette Blanton allegedly suffered a perforated uterus during an abortion performed by a fourth-year medical student at a Womancare, Inc. clinic.
- Blanton retained attorney Wesley Harris to represent her in a malpractice action against the clinic and its staff.
- Harris discussed the possibility of arbitration with Blanton, who stated she would only consent to arbitration if her right to a subsequent trial de novo (a new trial) were preserved.
- Two days before the scheduled trial, on July 28, 1981, Harris entered into a written stipulation with the defendants' counsel without Blanton's knowledge or consent.
- The stipulation provided for binding arbitration, limited any potential award to Blanton to $15,000, and gave the defendant's attorney the exclusive right to select the arbitrator.
- Blanton did not learn of this binding arbitration agreement for nearly three months, at which point she immediately objected.
Procedural Posture:
- Harriette Blanton brought a malpractice action against Womancare, Inc., a medical student, and a supervising physician in trial court.
- The attorneys for both parties signed a stipulation, approved by the court, to take the case off the trial calendar and submit it to binding arbitration.
- Blanton's attorney also dismissed the supervising physician from the lawsuit.
- After learning of the stipulation, Blanton hired new counsel and moved to invalidate the agreement.
- The trial court denied Blanton's motion to set aside the binding arbitration agreement, finding it to be a 'procedural' matter within the attorney's discretion.
- The case proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendants.
- Blanton's new counsel filed a request for a trial de novo, which was rejected because the arbitration was binding.
- The arbitration award was entered as a judgment for the defendants in the trial court.
- Blanton appealed the judgment to the California Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an attorney have the apparent authority to bind a client to an agreement for binding arbitration, thereby waiving the client's substantial right to a trial, without the client's consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Grodin, J.
No. An attorney does not have the apparent authority to bind a client to binding arbitration without the client's consent, as doing so impairs the client's substantial rights. The court reasoned that the authority of an attorney to bind a client is governed by agency principles. While an attorney has implied authority to make procedural and tactical decisions, they are not authorized to impair a client's substantial rights or the cause of action itself. The court classified the right to a trial in a judicial forum as a substantial right, not a mere procedural matter. Therefore, an agreement to waive this right by submitting a claim to binding arbitration requires the client's express consent. The opposing party assumes the risk when relying on an attorney's authority for such a substantial decision without verifying it with the client.
Concurring - Bird, C. J.
No. The concurring opinion agrees with the outcome but emphasizes that the decision to waive the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial must always rest with the client, not the attorney. The distinction between 'procedural' and 'substantial' rights is unclear; the better distinction is between routine matters and important, substantial rights. Waiving a jury trial by stipulating to binding arbitration is a waiver of a fundamental right. While an attorney's professional expertise is vital, the ultimate determination to waive a right as fundamental as a jury trial must be made by the client.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between an attorney's tactical authority and the client's ultimate control over substantial rights. It establishes that shifting a dispute from a judicial forum to binding arbitration is not a procedural decision but a fundamental one that waives the constitutional right to a trial. The ruling places a burden on opposing counsel to verify an attorney's authority before entering into agreements that extinguish a client's core litigation rights. This protects clients from unknowingly forfeiting their day in court and reinforces the principle that ultimate decision-making power on substantial matters remains with the client.
