Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell
15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1776, 418 F. Supp. 1 (1975)
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Rule of Law:
A judge's personal characteristics such as race or sex, prior professional experience in a related field of law, or judicial rulings made during the course of a case do not constitute personal bias from an extrajudicial source sufficient to require disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Facts:
- A female plaintiff applied for an attorney position with the defendant law firm.
- The defendant law firm rejected the plaintiff's application for employment.
- The plaintiff alleged that the defendant firm engages in a pattern of discrimination against women in the hiring of lawyers.
- The case was assigned to Judge Constance Baker Motley, a Black woman who, prior to her appointment, had a legal career working on civil rights cases.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the defendant law firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- The plaintiff alleged that the defendant firm discriminates on the basis of sex in its employment of lawyers.
- The district court certified the lawsuit as a class action.
- The defendant firm filed an application requesting that the presiding judge, Judge Motley, disqualify herself on grounds of personal bias.
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Issue:
Does a judge's sex, race, prior experience as a civil rights attorney, or judicial rulings made in the pending litigation constitute personal bias from an extrajudicial source requiring disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Motley
No. A judge's identity, background, and judicial rulings do not, without more, constitute the personal, extrajudicial bias required for disqualification. The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires a showing of 'personal' prejudice stemming from an 'extrajudicial source'—that is, a bias originating outside of the court proceedings. The defendant's complaints about the court's procedural rulings, such as certifying the class action, are matters for appeal, not grounds for disqualification. Furthermore, to hold that a judge's race, sex, or prior legal background is sufficient for recusal would create an untenable standard where no judge could hear cases touching upon their own life experiences or identity, a result contrary to the principles of the judiciary.
Analysis:
This opinion strongly reaffirms the high threshold for judicial disqualification based on bias. It establishes a crucial precedent that a judge's demographic identity or professional background is not, in itself, evidence of partiality. The decision protects judges from underrepresented groups from being forced off cases involving civil rights and discrimination, preventing litigants from 'judge shopping' based on a judge's identity. It clearly distinguishes between disfavored judicial rulings, which are properly addressed through the appellate process, and actual personal bias stemming from an extrajudicial source, which is the sole basis for recusal under § 144.
