Blanchard v. Bergeron et al.
489 U.S. 87 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A pre-existing contingent-fee agreement between a plaintiff and their attorney does not serve as an automatic ceiling on the amount of 'reasonable' attorney's fees that can be awarded to a prevailing party under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988).
Facts:
- Arthur J. Blanchard was beaten by Sheriff's Deputy James Bergeron while inside a business called Oudrey's Odyssey Lounge.
- Blanchard hired an attorney to represent him in a civil rights lawsuit against the deputy and others.
- Blanchard and his attorney entered into a contingent-fee agreement for the representation.
- Under the terms of the agreement, the attorney was to receive 40% of any monetary damages Blanchard was awarded in the lawsuit.
Procedural Posture:
- Arthur J. Blanchard filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy James Bergeron and others in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Blanchard, awarding him $5,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages.
- Blanchard, as the prevailing party, moved for an award of attorney's fees under § 1988, requesting over $40,000.
- The District Court awarded Blanchard $7,500 in attorney's fees.
- Blanchard (appellant) appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing it was too low.
- The Court of Appeals reduced the award to $4,000, holding that the 40% contingent-fee agreement acted as a cap on the recoverable fees.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Blanchard's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a private contingent-fee agreement between a civil rights plaintiff and their attorney limit the amount of a 'reasonable' attorney's fee that a court may award to the plaintiff as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No, a private contingent-fee agreement does not limit the amount of a 'reasonable' attorney's fee that a court may award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The statute contemplates reasonable compensation for the time and effort expended by the attorney, calculated using the lodestar method, which involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The legislative history and precedent, including the proper interpretation of the 12 factors from Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, show that a fee agreement is just one factor for a court to consider and is not determinative. Capping fees based on a contingency agreement would undermine the statute's purpose, which is to encourage the litigation of meritorious civil rights claims—including those seeking injunctive or declaratory relief—that vindicate important rights but may not result in large monetary awards.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
No, the contingent-fee agreement is not a cap on the fee award. While agreeing with the majority's conclusion, this opinion objects to its method of statutory interpretation, specifically its heavy reliance on the legislative history and its detailed analysis of lower court cases cited in a committee report. Congress enacts statutes, not committee reports, and it is unrealistic to believe that members of Congress read and endorsed every case citation within those reports. The proper approach is to develop a reasonable interpretation of the statute's text and apparent purpose, which supports the conclusion that a 'reasonable fee' is not limited by a private contract, rather than treating case citations from a committee report as binding law.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'lodestar' method as the primary framework for calculating statutory attorney's fees in civil rights cases, preventing fee awards from being artificially capped by private contracts. It ensures that attorneys are incentivized to take on complex or low-damage civil rights cases where the primary goal might be injunctive relief rather than a large monetary award. By delinking the reasonable fee from the plaintiff's damage recovery, the ruling reinforces the public policy goal of § 1988: to encourage private enforcement of civil rights laws for the benefit of both the individual and society at large.
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