Blakeley v. Gorin
313 N.E.2d 903 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
Under Massachusetts General Laws c. 184, § 30, a court may deny specific enforcement of a restrictive covenant, even if it provides an actual and substantial benefit, and award monetary damages instead if enforcement would be inequitable, contrary to the public interest, and impede the reasonable use of land for its most suitable purpose.
Facts:
- In the mid-19th century, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts established a series of restrictive covenants, known as the 'Commonwealth Restrictions,' for the development of Boston's Back Bay.
- The petitioners own two adjoining land parcels: one vacant lot and one that houses the Ritz-Carlton Hotel.
- The respondents own an adjacent eight-story apartment building at 12-14 Commonwealth Avenue.
- Both parties' properties are subject to the Commonwealth Restrictions, including one requiring that a sixteen-foot-wide passageway at the rear of the properties 'be kept open.'
- The petitioners plan to build a new 285-foot high hotel-apartment complex on the vacant lot.
- The plan includes a twelve-story structure that would bridge over the passageway to connect the new building with the existing Ritz-Carlton.
- This bridge would obstruct the space above the passageway, thereby diminishing the light and air available to the thirty-two rear apartments in the respondents' building.
- The petitioners' lot has remained vacant for over a decade.
Procedural Posture:
- The petitioners, owners of the Ritz-Carlton and an adjacent vacant lot, filed a petition in the Massachusetts Superior Court.
- The petition sought a declaration under G. L. c. 240, § 10A and c. 184, § 30 that the 'Commonwealth Restrictions' on their land were obsolete and unenforceable.
- The respondents, owners of an adjacent apartment building, appeared as respondents in opposition to the petition.
- The Superior Court judge ruled in favor of the petitioners, finding the restrictions obsolete and declaring them unenforceable without an award of damages.
- The respondents appealed the final decree to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
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Issue:
Does Massachusetts General Laws c. 184, § 30, which permits a court to deny specific enforcement of a restrictive covenant and award money damages if enforcement is inequitable or contrary to the public interest, constitute an unconstitutional taking of a property interest for a private purpose?
Opinions:
Majority - Hennessey, J.
No, the statute is constitutional as applied. The law does not constitute an unconstitutional taking because it can be viewed as altering the remedies for enforcing property rights, a traditional power of courts and legislatures, rather than extinguishing the right itself. Even if considered a 'taking,' it is for a valid public purpose, which includes promoting the reasonable use of land, increasing its marketability, and enhancing the municipal tax base. The trial court's finding that enforcing the restriction would be contrary to the public interest distinguishes this case from precedents that struck down similar statutes where no public interest was served. Applying the statute's factors, the court found that drastic changes in the neighborhood, the existence of modern public land-use controls, and the need to avoid impeding the most suitable use of the land all weighed against specific enforcement. The balance of equities heavily favors the petitioners, as the harm from an injunction would be immense compared to the respondents' loss of light and air, for which they will receive full and fair money damages.
Dissenting - Quirico, J.
Yes, the statute is unconstitutional as applied. This statute permits a private party to take the vested property rights of another for its own private profit, which is an unconstitutional taking without a public purpose. The court incorrectly equates 'public interest,' such as an increased tax base, with the constitutionally required 'public purpose' necessary to justify eminent domain. This decision effectively allows a private entity to exercise the power of eminent domain for its own benefit, which is precisely what the Constitution forbids and what the precedent in Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick held was impermissible. Even if the statute were constitutional, the facts do not warrant denying an injunction, as light and air have become more, not less, valuable in a congested urban environment, and the petitioners purchased the property with full knowledge of the restrictions.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant shift in property law, subordinating the absolute right to enforce restrictive covenants to broader public policy goals like economic development and the efficient use of urban land. It validates legislative efforts to provide courts with flexibility in land-use disputes, allowing them to award damages instead of injunctions that could halt major development projects. The case broadens the definition of 'public purpose' to include indirect benefits like an enhanced tax base, thereby empowering private developers to overcome antiquated deed restrictions if they can demonstrate that their project serves a public interest and that compensation for the harmed party is possible. This creates a form of 'private eminent domain,' where economic efficiency and public benefit can outweigh a landowner's right to specific performance of a covenant.
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