Blackman v. Great American First Savings Bank
284 Cal. Rptr. 491, 91 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6780, 233 Cal. App. 3d 598 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An employee traveling from work to a class as part of a voluntary, employer-subsidized educational program is not acting within the scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Such travel falls under the general 'going-and-coming' rule and does not qualify for the 'special errand' or 'incidental benefit' exceptions.
Facts:
- Sue Petersen-Parker was a full-time payroll accountant for Great American First Savings Bank (Great American).
- Petersen-Parker was pursuing a business administration degree at San Diego State University, which she had started before working for Great American.
- Great American offered a voluntary educational assistance program, which reimbursed Petersen-Parker's tuition and book expenses.
- In return for the financial aid, Petersen-Parker signed a contract agreeing to remain an employee for five years or reimburse a portion of the funds.
- Participation in the program was not a mandatory condition of employment, and only 1-2% of all Great American employees participated.
- On December 7, 1988, after completing her work shift, Petersen-Parker was driving her personal vehicle from the Great American parking lot to her class.
- While making a left-hand turn, Petersen-Parker's car was struck by a motorcycle driven by Kent Arthur Blackman, causing him serious injury.
- Great American did not reimburse Petersen-Parker for travel time or mileage expenses for her commute to the university.
Procedural Posture:
- Kent Arthur Blackman sued Sue Petersen-Parker and Great American First Savings Bank in trial court for injuries sustained in the collision.
- Great American filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not vicariously liable for Petersen-Parker's actions as a matter of law.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Great American.
- Blackman, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does an employer become vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for an employee's negligence while driving from work to a college class, when the employer subsidizes the education as a voluntary fringe benefit?
Opinions:
Majority - Work, J.
No. An employer is not vicariously liable for an employee's negligence while driving to a class subsidized by the employer because this activity does not fall within the scope of employment. The court reasoned that Petersen's trip from her job to her university class falls under the 'going-and-coming' rule, which generally holds that an employee's commute is not within the scope of employment. The court rejected the argument that this was a 'special errand' because Great American did not order or specifically request that Petersen attend class; her participation was voluntary and part of a 'fringe benefit' program. Furthermore, while Great American received an indirect, long-term benefit from Petersen's education, this benefit was not substantial enough to justify making the employer responsible for the risks of her travel. The court also distinguished this case from workers' compensation law, noting that the policy considerations for respondeat superior are different and do not favor the same broad interpretation of 'scope of employment' that is applied in workers' compensation cases.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the limits of the 'special errand' and 'incidental benefit' exceptions to the going-and-coming rule in the context of respondeat superior. It establishes that a voluntary, employer-subsidized educational program, considered a fringe benefit, does not transform an employee's commute to class into a work-related trip for tort liability purposes. The case reinforces the critical distinction between the broad scope of employment applied in workers' compensation cases (driven by social insurance policies) and the narrower scope for third-party tort liability, where courts are more hesitant to impute liability to an employer. This precedent helps shield employers from expanded liability for employee actions related to voluntary benefit programs, thus encouraging them to offer such perks without fear of unforeseen legal risks.
