Blackledge v. Allison
431 U.S. 63 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
A state prisoner's sworn statements made during a guilty plea hearing are not an absolute bar to a later federal habeas corpus claim alleging an unkept plea bargain. A federal court cannot summarily dismiss such a habeas petition if it contains specific factual allegations that are not 'palpably incredible' or 'patently frivolous,' particularly when the record of the plea proceeding is minimal.
Facts:
- Gary Darrell Allison was indicted in North Carolina for breaking and entering, attempted safe robbery, and possession of burglary tools.
- Allison's court-appointed attorney, Mr. Pickard, allegedly informed Allison that he had arranged a plea bargain with the prosecutor and judge for a 10-year sentence if Allison pleaded guilty to attempted safe robbery.
- Allison's attorney allegedly instructed him to answer the court's routine questions during the plea hearing in a way that would ensure the judge accepted the plea, which included denying the existence of any promises.
- At his arraignment, Allison pleaded guilty to attempted safe robbery.
- During the plea colloquy, which consisted of the judge reading questions from a standard form, Allison answered 'No' to the question, 'Has the Solicitor, or your lawyer, or any policeman, law officer or anyone else made any promises or threat to you to influence you to plead guilty in this case?'
- Allison also affirmed that he understood he could be imprisoned for a minimum of 10 years to life.
- Three days later, a judge sentenced Allison to 17-21 years in prison.
Procedural Posture:
- After his conviction, Allison unsuccessfully exhausted his state collateral remedies.
- Allison, a state prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court against Warden Blackledge.
- The District Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the signed plea form from the state court hearing conclusively showed the plea was voluntary.
- Allison filed a petition for rehearing, which the District Court also denied after referral to a magistrate.
- Allison, the appellant, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that Allison's allegations were not foreclosed by his answers on the plea form.
- Warden Blackledge, the petitioner, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition, which makes specific factual allegations of an unkept plea bargain, require an evidentiary hearing even when the prisoner's in-court statements during the original plea proceeding, as recorded on a standard form, state that no promises were made?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
No. A state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition containing specific factual allegations of an unkept plea bargain is not subject to summary dismissal merely because those allegations are contradicted by statements made during a plea proceeding, particularly when the record of that proceeding is sparse. The Court reasoned that while a defendant's solemn declarations in open court create a formidable barrier to a later collateral attack, that barrier is not invariably insurmountable. Citing precedents like Machibroda v. United States, the Court held that a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if their allegations are specific, not conclusory, and not 'palpably incredible.' Allison’s petition met this standard by detailing the specific promise (a 10-year sentence), who made it (his lawyer after consulting with the prosecutor and judge), and a witness. The Court gave significant weight to the context of the plea, noting that in 1972, plea bargaining was often a 'sub rosa' process where participants were expected to conceal the agreement in court. The minimal record, consisting only of a standard form with no transcript, did nothing to dispel a defendant's belief that bargains must remain secret, rendering Allison's in-court denial less conclusive.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Powell
No. I agree that Allison is entitled to a hearing, but I write to emphasize the importance of finality in criminal judgments. This case is an example of how finality is frustrated by the failure to adhere to proper procedures at the trial court level. The need for a hearing five years after conviction arises primarily because the record, consisting of only a certified printed form, leaves room for doubt about the plea's reliability. If modern, more thorough procedures—such as those now required in North Carolina which mandate an on-the-record discussion of any plea agreement—had been followed, a collateral attack like Allison's would justify a hearing 'only in the most extraordinary circumstances.' Adherence to proper procedure serves both justice and finality.
Analysis:
This decision balances the finality of guilty pleas against a defendant's constitutional right to a voluntary and intelligent plea. By refusing to establish a per se rule that in-court statements bar later contradictory claims, the Court acknowledged the historical reality of concealed plea bargains. The ruling implicitly pressures state and federal courts to adopt more transparent and comprehensive plea colloquy procedures, similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, that place the entire plea agreement on the record. A robust, transcribed record makes subsequent collateral attacks less likely to succeed, thereby enhancing the finality of convictions while ensuring the plea was constitutionally sound from the outset.
