Blaak v. Davidson
529 P.2d 1048, 84 Wash. 2d 882, 1975 Wash. LEXIS 1113 (1975)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When a driver's vision is completely obscured by an atmospheric condition, the driver is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop; rather, the question of negligence should be submitted to the jury to determine if the driver acted as a reasonable person would under all the facts and circumstances.
Facts:
- On September 16, 1971, defendant Davidson was driving an 18,000-pound gasoline truck on a highway adjacent to recently plowed farmlands.
- Strong wind gusts periodically created large dust clouds that significantly reduced visibility.
- After safely passing through one dust cloud, Davidson's truck was engulfed by a second, denser dust cloud that completely obscured his vision.
- Davidson slowed to 5-10 mph but did not stop, fearing a rear-end collision on the high-speed road, because the shoulder was too narrow to pull over, and because he knew a safe pull-out area was a short distance ahead.
- Plaintiff's automobile, also in the dust cloud, had slowed to nearly a complete stop (2-3 mph) in the lane of travel.
- Davidson's truck, with its headlights on, struck the rear of the plaintiff's car.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued defendant Davidson in a state trial court for personal injury damages.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, Davidson.
- The trial court judge granted the plaintiff's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) on the issue of liability.
- Davidson, as appellant, appealed the judgment n.o.v. to the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- Davidson, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of Washington, which granted the petition.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a driver negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop their vehicle when their vision is completely obscured by an atmospheric condition, such as a dust storm?
Opinions:
Majority - Finley, J.
No. A driver is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop when vision is completely obscured; the issue is a question for the jury. The court rejected its prior inconsistent precedents which created an absolute duty to stop for some atmospheric conditions (like dust or sun glare) but not for others (like fog). The court found no logical distinction between these conditions and concluded that creating a rigid, mechanistic rule of conduct for driving is unworkable and often unjust. It analogized such a rule to the failed "stop, look, and listen" railroad crossing rule from Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman. Instead, the court adopted a uniform standard: the jury should consider all surrounding circumstances—such as the type of vehicle, the dangers of stopping on the highway, and the availability of safe alternatives—to determine whether the driver acted as a reasonable person would have.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a long-standing conflict in Washington negligence law, replacing a set of inconsistent, condition-specific rules with a single, flexible standard. By rejecting an absolute duty to stop when vision is obscured, the court shifted the determination of negligence in such cases from a question of law for the judge to a question of fact for the jury. This empowers the jury to conduct a more nuanced, fact-sensitive inquiry into the reasonableness of a driver's actions, making it more difficult for parties to win such cases on summary judgment or directed verdict.
