Bishop v. Wood et al.
426 U.S. 341 (1976)
Rule of Law:
The existence of a constitutionally protected property interest in public employment is determined by reference to state law, not the U.S. Constitution. A public employee's liberty interest in their reputation is only implicated by a termination if the employer publicly discloses stigmatizing reasons for the discharge.
Facts:
- Carl Bishop was hired as a probationary policeman by the City of Marion, North Carolina, on June 9, 1969.
- After six months, Bishop's status changed to that of a 'permanent employee'.
- A city ordinance specified that a permanent employee could be dismissed if they were negligent, inefficient, unfit to perform their duties, or failed to meet work standards.
- On March 31, 1972, the City Manager terminated Bishop's employment without a pre-termination hearing.
- The City Manager privately communicated the reasons for the dismissal to Bishop, which included failure to follow orders, poor attendance at training classes, causing low morale, and conduct unsuited to an officer.
- Bishop asserted that these stated reasons for his dismissal were false.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Bishop sued the City Manager, Chief of Police, and the City of Marion in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- Bishop appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
- A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, with one judge dissenting.
- The Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc and, by an equally divided vote, affirmed the district court's judgment.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Bishop's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a permanent public employee have a property or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in their continued employment when a city ordinance lists grounds for dismissal but state law is interpreted as creating an 'at-will' employment relationship, and the reasons for termination are not made public?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. A public employee's employment status does not constitute a protected property or liberty interest if state law defines the position as terminable at will and the reasons for discharge are not publicly disclosed. A property interest in employment must be based on a legitimate claim of entitlement derived from an independent source like state law. In this case, the lower federal courts, familiar with North Carolina law, concluded the ordinance did not grant Bishop a right to continued employment but merely established procedures, thereby making him an employee 'at the will and pleasure of the city.' The Supreme Court defers to this interpretation. Furthermore, Bishop’s liberty interest was not implicated because the reasons for his discharge were communicated to him privately; without public disclosure, no stigma attached that would damage his standing in the community. The truth or falsity of the stated reasons is irrelevant to the constitutional claim if they are not publicized.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The employee was deprived of both liberty and property interests without due process. The reasons given for Bishop's discharge, such as 'conduct unsuited to an officer,' constitute a 'badge of infamy' that severely damages his future employment prospects, thus implicating a liberty interest that requires a hearing to clear his name. The Court's requirement of public disclosure is flawed because it is inevitable that prospective employers will learn of these stigmatizing reasons. Furthermore, it was objectively reasonable for Bishop to believe he had a property interest in his job based on the 'permanent' classification and the ordinance's 'for cause' dismissal criteria, which at minimum required further factual development rather than summary judgment.
Dissenting - Justice White
Yes. The employee's ordinance-based right to his job constituted a property interest that could not be deprived without due process. The majority's reasoning—that a substantive right to employment can be conditioned by limited procedural protections—is precisely the 'bitter with the sweet' argument that was rejected by a majority of the Court in Arnett v. Kennedy. The Marion city ordinance plainly conditions dismissal on cause. Once the state grants such a substantive right, it is the Federal Constitution, not state law, that dictates the minimum procedures required to deprive an individual of that right. The absence of state-provided procedures for a hearing cannot eliminate the constitutionally-protected property interest itself.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The Court erred in its interpretation of North Carolina law and its reliance on Arnett v. Kennedy. The North Carolina case law cited by the majority, Still v. Lance, actually supports the existence of a property interest here, as it distinguished between end-of-year non-renewals and for-cause dismissals during the year. The Marion ordinance, by establishing a 'for cause' standard, is analogous to the latter and creates a legitimate expectation of continued employment. This expectation is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, which requires that appropriate procedures be followed before termination.
Analysis:
This decision significantly limited the scope of federal procedural due process protections for public employees. By emphasizing that property interests are creatures of state law and deferring to lower courts' interpretations, the Court made it more difficult for employees to establish a federal claim of entitlement to their jobs. The ruling also narrowed the concept of a liberty interest by requiring public disclosure of stigmatizing information, thereby insulating public employers from due process claims so long as they keep the reasons for termination private. Consequently, the case shifted the resolution of many public employment disputes from federal constitutional law to state contract and administrative law.
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