Bishop v. City of Chicago
1970 Ill. App. LEXIS 1283, 257 N.E.2d 152, 121 Ill. App. 2d 33 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
An airport operator does not have a common law duty to rescue occupants of an aircraft that crashes into adjacent waters if the operator was not responsible for the cause of the crash. The duty owed to a business invitee for safe ingress and egress does not extend to rescue operations for perils not created by the landowner.
Facts:
- The City of Chicago managed and controlled Meigs Field, an airport located on the shore of Lake Michigan.
- Aircraft approaching Meigs Field were compelled to fly over Lake Michigan to reach the runway.
- On March 29, 1966, pilot David H. Bishop's aircraft experienced operational difficulties after taking off from O'Hare Field, also managed by the City of Chicago.
- Air traffic control at O'Hare instructed Bishop to proceed to Meigs Field for an emergency landing.
- Bishop was unable to reach the runway and was forced to land his aircraft in Lake Michigan, approximately 500 yards from the field.
- Bishop exited the downed aircraft and stood on its wing.
- A rowboat dispatched by the Chicago Fire Department was sent to the scene, but by the time it arrived, the plane had sunk and Bishop had drowned.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, representing the estate of David H. Bishop, filed a wrongful death action against the City of Chicago in the trial court.
- The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's original complaint on August 3, 1967.
- The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint.
- On February 1, 1968, the trial court dismissed the second amended complaint for failure to allege facts sufficient to establish a legal duty to rescue.
- The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court.
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Issue:
Does an airport operator, which controls an airfield adjacent to a large body of water, have an affirmative legal duty to rescue occupants of an aircraft that is forced to land in the water due to a mechanical failure not caused by the operator?
Opinions:
Majority - McCormick
No. An airport operator does not have an affirmative legal duty to rescue individuals from perils it did not create. The court reasoned that this case falls under the general common law rule that a mere bystander has no liability for failing to rescue another in distress. While the airport owes a duty to business invitees, like pilots, to provide reasonably safe ingress and egress, this duty is confined to the physical condition of the airport and its approaches. The decedent's peril was caused by mechanical failure of the aircraft, which was unrelated to any condition or act of the defendant. The court rejected the argument that statutes requiring a 'safe approach' impose a rescue duty, interpreting them as requiring only the removal of physical obstructions. Finally, the court held that performing a rescue in a few isolated prior incidents does not constitute a voluntary assumption of a permanent legal duty to rescue in all future cases.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms the traditional, and often harsh, common law principle that there is no general duty to rescue. The court narrowly construes the scope of duty owed by a landowner to a business invitee, limiting it strictly to dangers on the premises or related to the physical means of access. By rejecting arguments based on foreseeability, public policy, and voluntary undertaking, the case establishes a strong precedent against imposing affirmative rescue duties on entities that do not create the initial peril. This ruling solidifies the legal distinction between a duty to prevent harm on one's property and an affirmative duty to render aid for off-property accidents, even when they are foreseeable.
